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Ports, specifically seaports, have played a cardinal role in the international seaborne trade 
and have been vital for fostering the economic growth of a nation. Moreover, ports have been 
considered as key economic drivers for a nation’s economy and success. In to-day’s global 
environment ports are a vital link in the supply chain of transport with ports operational 
efficiency a critical factor for the handling of goods in the international economy. Ports and 
indeed, harbours are seen to be interfaces between land and water. Palmer suggests that 
ports are points of interaction between peoples and cultures. But ports, and indeed, harbours 
are places and places have history and the history of a place affects its present.1 For Palmer 
history matters and helps to take a longer view of port development and allows us to 
distinguish between new developments and the experience of old problems which sometimes 
can be dressed up in a new form.  
 
This thesis presents an analysis and evaluation of Cork Harbour Commissioners from its early 
beginnings in the 19th century up to 1900.  Chapter 1 details the emergence and more 
importantly the consolidation of Cork Harbour Commissioners as a harbour authority in the 
early decades of the century. The extensive port and harbour dredging investment and the 
significant benefits that accrued, in the second half of the century, are outlined in Chapter 2. 
The lower harbour was to play a significant role in the development of the port particularly 
 
1 Palmer, Sarah, ‘Current port trends in an historical perspective’, Journal for Maritime 
 Research, vol. 1, December 1999, p. 1; Tull, Malcolm, ‘Port history in the International Journal 
 of Maritime History (1989–2012)’, International Journal of Maritime History, vol. 26, 
 January 2014, p. 124. 
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where American mails and emigration were concerned, and this is examined and evaluated 
in Chapter 3. 
Cork, the port and harbour will be examined in terms of its economic history in the 19th 
century, with emphasis on matters of governance, infrastructure, and finances. 
There has been mention of a harbour and a port so it would be important to differentiate 
between them. A harbour is where a body of water is protected from wind, waves and 
currents and is used by vessels as a place of safety from storms. The principal elements of a 
harbour are its natural features: protection from waves, shelter from storm winds and tides, 
freedom from strong currents, sufficient depth of water to permit a vessel to enter the 
protected area of the harbour and a bottom to hold a vessels anchor. Harbours can be natural 
or artificial with Cork regarded as a natural harbour.2 A port, on the other hand, can be 
described as a man-made coastal or riverine facility where ships can load or unload. These 
facilities include docks, wharves, piers, quays, and cranes for loading/unloading.3  
Cork has been regarded as both a river and ocean port. The upper harbour was regarded as 
the river port and the lower harbour as the ocean port. Historically, the Port of Cork has been 
classified as a port of call, a transit port, and a port of distribution.4 The entrance to the 
harbour is through a passage without a bar and consists of two channels. The channels are 
divided by a rock known as the harbour rock and form one broad approach once the rock is 




2 McCarthy, T.F., ‘Major Harbour Authorities in Ireland-a critical appraisal’, Diploma in 
 Administrative Science, Institute of Public Administration (Dublin, 1979), p. 3. 
3 ibid. 
4 Port of Cork Handbook (Cork, 1955), P. 2. 
 
 
                                                                        3 
The Port of Cork lies at the south western part of the island and is often described as the 
dairying region of Ireland. The region has a “series of lofty, barren ridges of old red sandstone, 
trending roughly east-north-east to west-south-west, separated by damp fertile valleys of 
carboniferous limestone covered by superficial deposits and where the low land reaches the 
sea in the west, the valleys become long narrow inlets of the sea called rias”.5 Cork Harbour 
is thus perfectly situated at the centre of the Munster dairying region.  
 
A city has a great environmental advantage in being located on the coast or the tidal waters 
of a river. The water becomes the lifeline for the city through imports of raw materials and 
the export of goods. Trade is the lifeblood of the city.6 In economic terms, from earliest times, 
people have been aware of the strategic significance of locating their settlements on 
waterways. So, what determines the location of a city? Saunders, in relation, to Cork says, 
“The location of the city was determined by its facilities for defence at the time of its founding 
and for its position near the head of the tidal waters giving it good access to the sea on the 
one hand and to the hinterland of Cork and Munster on the other”.7  
 
The presence of the Vikings in the inner city area seems to have a profound effect on the 
development of Cork port and while the development of Cork city and Cork port have been 
closely entwined and mutually dependent, never was that more evident than in the 10th and 
11th centuries. The Viking presence was an important and influential one. It is assumed that 
 
5 Stamp, D.D., An agricultural atlas of Ireland (London, 1931), p. 57. 
6 Pettit, Sean, The Making of the Port of Cork (unpublished 1986, Cork Harbour Commissioners), 
 p. 1. The original manuscript is kept by the Port of Cork Company. The Port of Cork Company 
 succeeded Cork Harbour Commissioners in 1997. 
7 Saunders, F. O’C, ‘The Development of the River Port of Cork City’, The Institution of Civil 
 Engineers of Ireland, vol. 82, March 1956, p. 115. Saunders was harbour engineer from 1933 
 to 1960. 
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the Vikings, who were traders and dealers, brought business and wealth to the city which 
previously had not existed.8 The city of Cork, both in its physical shape and its statutory legal 
existence, came into being when the Normans came to settle on the banks of the River Lee. 
The Normans brought to Cork what was emerging as a blueprint of a small European city. The 
city got its first charter in 1185 and subsequent charters gave greater definition to the means 
of government and municipal responsibilities. The charter was a legal one setting out rights 
and duties that established local government, leading in time to the establishment of Cork 
Corporation and the office of mayor. The main imports of the time were wine, cloth and 
spices. Exports, on the other hand, were wool, grain, beef, and other agricultural produce. 
In 1569 "Tunnage" duties on wine were introduced in Cork and presumably, the term tonnage 
derived in later centuries. Harbour dues or tonnage rates are charged on the calculation of 
the cargo-carrying capacity of a ship.9 Exports from Cork during the sixteenth century included 
hides, wool and woodfells (skins with wool on them) to France and England. Imports during 
the century covered a wide range of household items, including metals such as iron, brass, 
lead, pewter and tin.10 From 1600 onwards Cork had left its medieval period behind and by 
1641 had become a much stronger economy and a major centre for the import and export of 
goods. The export of hides, pipestaves, rugs and tallow increased and imported goods 
including wine, salt, and other commodities; with trade to the West Indies about to begin in 
earnest.  
The dairying zone was the bedrock element of the Cork region and was never more evident 
than in the 17th century particularly with the increase in butter exports. Agricultural 
 
8 Pettit (1986), p. 6. 
9 O’Sullivan, W, The Economic History of Cork city from the earliest times to the Act of Union (Cork, 
1937), pp. 62-64. 
10 O'Sullivan (1937), p. 83; Mould, Daphne D.C. Porchin, Discovering Cork (Brandon, 2004), p. 23. 
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production increased to match market demand and Dickson maintains that Cork’s reputation 
as a source of high quality provisions was made in the 17th century; particularly, as English 
and foreign investment found Cork had the advantage of having a natural harbour and was 
adjacent to South England’s Atlantic sea route. As well, “there was a high volume processing 
centre adjacent to abundant grasslands where durable and appropriate foodstuffs were 
available for tropical markets”.11 As the century ended the dairy industry had been revived 
and butter was now the port’s principal product. Merchants were, as Pettit describes, 
“looking seawards”. Reclamation was taking place to build stronger quay walls and yet the 
over-riding need was for the river to be navigable.12 
The last decade of the 17th century saw the emergence of the growing role of Cork and Cullen 
illustrates this by showing that Cork had 12.4% of the national revenue from duties on foreign 
trade in 1681/1682 and how this increased to 21% in 1700 and 22% in 1709/1710.13 Whilst 
the Cattle Acts of 1667, which forbade the importation of livestock into England, had a major 
effect on Irish trade, it also made Cork look beyond Britain to the West Indies and North 
America. The provisions trade was seen to develop accordingly.14  
 At the start of the 18th century, Dickson in his examination of shipping and ship ownership 
states that a fundamental characteristic of Cork’s maritime enterprise was that very little of 
the region’s ‘staples ‘was carried to foreign markets on Cork shipping. Whilst Bristol, in 
particular, had played a pivotal role in the development of South Munster trade in the 17th 
century there was a change by the early 1760’s with the role of Liverpool and London ports 
 
11 Dickson, David, Old World Colony, Cork and South Munster 1630-1830 (Cork, 2005), p. 150. 
12 Pettit, Sean, History of the Port of Cork (unpublished 1996, Cork Harbour Commissioners), 
 p. 1. The original manuscript is kept by the Port of Cork Company. The Port of Cork 
 Company succeeded Cork Harbour Commissioners in 1997. p. 11. 
13 L.M. Cullen, ‘Economic Development 1750-1800’ in T. W. Moody and W.E. Vaughan,  A New History 
of Ireland, volume iv, eighteenth –century Ireland, 1691-1800 (Oxford, 1986), p. 181. 
14 Pettit (1996), p. 8. 
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becoming more prominent and that is clear when examining the shipping movements of 
Cork.15 
It was the second half of the 18th century that the mercantile trade of Cork jumped from 
routine to something approaching the spectacular. The source of the expansion in the 
shipping trade and the consequent generation of wealth was the export of provisions, 
especially salted butter. The provision trade had the enormous advantage of being an 
indigenous industry drawing its product from the rich pasture lands of south Munster. This 
could be seen, in that there was a fivefold increase in tonnage through the port during the 
century whereas Dublin and Limerick recorded lower increases.16 
As early as 1720, before any regulations came into play, 38% of Irish butter exports passed 
through the city of Cork. By 1774 Cork’s share of the continental market had risen to 66% and 
88% of the American market. The 1729 Act was passed for the cleansing and deepening of 
the river and harbour of Cork and the building of a ballast office. It could be said that the 1729 
Act was the first piece of legislation that defined the port as being separate from the city and, 
how tonnage rates were to be charged on all vessels using the harbour. 
Transatlantic markets, such as Barbados, Leeward Island and Jamaica were all serviced from 
Cork. Lisbon and Oporto were important ports for cargoes coming from Cork which were then 
transhipped to Portuguese colonies in South America. Already, Cork had captured an 
appreciable share of the export of beef to Britain and Europe and in 1782 45.7% of the total 
exports of beef from Ireland passed through Cork.17 Thus it could be said that the city emerged 
 
15 Dickson (2005), p. 154. 
16 Pettit (1996), p. 12.  
17 Pettit (1996), pp. 12-13. 
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as a major economic centre not only in Ireland but in Europe, the West Indies, and North 
America. 
 An important event took place in 1769 with the formation of a committee of merchants of 
the Cork butter market. A group of 23 merchants had formed a voluntary organisation with 
the purpose to improve the regulation of the butter market. They had also proposed to set 
up an inspectorate at their own expense. However, it must be seen that their true motive was 
to weaken the power of the city butter buyers. O’Sullivan points out that the trading 
organisation established by the merchants lasted over a century and a half and was without 
legal sanction for many of those years and depended solely on the integrity of those who 
controlled and administered it to maintain its existence.18 By 1768/1769 Cork had over 35% 
of Irish butter exports and had increased to 50% by 1790.19 Needless, to say, salted butter 
became an important export, if not the most important, for the port. The regions fertile 
valleys supported dairy herds which supplied Cork with butter and the growing population of 
Cork which increased from 17,600 in 1706 to 57,000 in 1796. 
In the period 1760 to 1770 in value terms the port was exporting more than it was importing 
and Cork, according to Leland, was a ‘’conveyor belt for the agricultural richness of 
Munster’’.20 Yet, as Pettit points out local merchants involved in the export trade were very 
passive in seeking out further export markets. The port took an important step in its future 
when in the late 1770’s work began on the ‘New Wall’ built downriver from the expanded 
city. This wall extended along the current site of shipping and whilst of no great significance 
 
18 O’Sullivan, W, The Economic History of Cork city from the earliest times to the Act of Union (Cork, 
1937), p.279. 
19 Breen, Mary, Waterford port and harbour,1815-42, (Dublin, 2019), p.13. 
20 Leland, Mary, The Endless Adventure, History of Cork Harbour Commissioners (Cork, 2001), p. 22. 
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to-day, at the time it was one of the first major decisions to accommodate imports and 
exports.21  
The prosperity of the city and port was seemingly assured by the expansion of British colonial 
interests, however, change was on its way; the Act of Union came into effect on the 1st 
January 1801 and from that point onward, activity changed radically with the economic 
system evolving into a more centralized laissez-faire structure.22  
In the medium term, the economy of Cork harbour was affected as the port no longer hosted 
Royal Navy fleets with the result that there was a decline in the supply of provisions. It should 
be remembered, as well, that the provisioning of British naval vessels during the revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars buffered many merchant fortunes.23  
From the late 18th century there was little funding available and this had left the port, and in 
particular quays, in a poor state of maintenance. These economic and structural challenges 









21 Pettit (1996), p. 15. 
22 McCann, Gerard, Ireland’s Economic History: Crisis and Development in the North and 
South (London, 2011), p. 5; Article 6 states there would be a mechanism to abolish tariff  
protection for Irish produce and that the Irish exchequer would be abolished, and the currencies 
merged.  
23 Fahy, A.M., ‘Place and Class in Cork’ in History & Society: interdisciplinary essays on the history  
 of an Irish county, (eds.), Flanagan, P. and Buttimer, C. (Dublin, 1993), p. 794. 
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Chapter 1:The Emergence and Consolidation of the Cork Harbour 
Commissioners 
 
1: Cork Port in 1800 
 
By 1800, Cork port was unregulated as regards shipping activities and had no port authority 
structure. The port was under the control of Cork Corporation, the municipal authority, in 
terms of financing, investment and shipping matters. The corporation had benefitted from 
the growing revenues of a prosperous city with revenues increasing from £900 in 1715 to 
about £1,200 by 1732 and had reached £7,000 by 1820.24 It must be remembered at this time 
the part of the city, where later, the City Hall, the Gas Works and the Marina Industrial Estate 
were built was still slob and marsh land with the area being referred to as a series of lakes.25 
At low water, the lakes became slob with the river as a channel and significantly, the state of 
the river was in such bad condition, it was described as being “most primitive”.26 So, in 
essence, the port consisted of river, marsh, channels and estuarine mud; with an urgent need 
to improve and invest in the infrastructure of the port.  






24 See Keane, John Joseph, ‘Four Tales of a city the transformation in the social, economic and political 
geography of Cork city 1780-1846’ (unpublished M.A thesis, University College Cork, 1990). 
25 Pettit (1996), p. 23. 
26 McCarthy (1949), pp. 1-9. He also states that Cork port was in a ‘’primitive state’’ up to the middle 
of the 19th century. 
27 Cullen, L. M, Anglo Irish Trade 1660-1800 (Manchester, 1968), pp. 21-2; O’Sullivan, W, 
 The Economic History of Cork city from the earliest times to the Act of Union (Cork, 1937), p. 148. 
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2: The Butter Weighhouse Act of 1813 and  1814 ‘Cocket Tax’ 28 
 
A first step to improve the port’s infrastructure was the passing into law of The Butter 
Weighhouse Act of 1813 under which commissioners were appointed to improve the ‘harbour 
and river of Cork’. Significantly, twenty-one merchants of the city were appointed as 
commissioners. These merchants along with the mayor and both high sheriffs made up the 
total of 24 commissioners. One third (1/3) of the fees received by the Weighmaster from the 
butter trade in the city went to the commissioners with the purpose to deepen, widen and 
improve the harbour and river of Cork. To illustrate Cork’s position nationally the port had 
35% of Irish butter exports in the year ended 1st June 1815 and Waterford 23%.29 
The following year, in 1814, the infamous ‘cocket’ tax was imposed as another form of 
revenue and was regarded as simply a tax on trade. It was known as the ‘Cocket and Entry  
Tax’ Act30 or ‘The Commercial Buildings Act’ of 1814. The 1814 Act noted the need for further 
port improvements due to the increase in the city’s trade. It provided for a tax of one shilling 
upon every entry, cocket, or warrant for all goods, inwards or outwards in the port less 10% 
to be retained by the Collector of Customs. The tax was peculiar to Cork and was a tax on 
customs documents rather than the value or quality of goods. The tax affected the retail trade 
the most and whilst, it may have seen to be an important source of revenue, it must be borne 
in mind that 10% of income was retained by the Collector of Customs with the balance equally 
divided between Cork Harbour Commissioners and the Commercial Buildings Company. 
Revenue from the tax in respect of Cork Harbour Commissioners in 1871 was £182 and 
 
28 The Butter Weighhouse Act of 1813. (53. Geo, 111.c.70). 
29 Hearne,J.M., ‘Waterford: economy ,society and politics,1780-1852’ (UCC:  PhD, 2001), p.10. 
30 Lantry, Mary, ‘The Cocket tax in Cork; a tax in the context of its time and place’ (unpublished M.A 
thesis, University College Cork, 2018); Statutory Instrument No. 274/1947 - Harbours Act, 1946 
(Abolition of Cocket and Entry Tax at Cork Harbour) Order, 1947. 
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decreased during the remainder of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th 
century; it increased subsequently with income of €1,600 reported in 1936.31 The ‘cocket’ tax 
was repealed under the 1946 Harbours Act. The tax was not levied on coast-wise vessels but 
after the passing of the Irish Free State Agreement 1922, the amount of tax was significant as 
England was deemed to be a foreign country. 
 
3: Cork Harbour Commissioners-early beginnings  
 
There were now two sets of commissioners, the first appointed under the 1813 Act and the 
second under the 1814 Act and both charged with the same responsibilities. They agreed to 
come together to form themselves into one board and the first meeting of the Cork Harbour 
Commissioners took place on the 21st September 1814 specifically to deal with its legal status 
and procedures to be adopted. The meeting regarded the purpose of the legislation as being 
two-fold: first, to raise money for the Commercial Buildings Company and secondly, rates to 
be charged on ship movements. An analysis of those present shows that the following groups 
were well represented: The Committee of Merchants, Quakers, Trustees, Corn and Butter 
Merchants and more significantly, members of the Commercial Buildings Company. So, the 
1814 legislation which was primarily set up to raise money for the Commercial Buildings 
Company had directors of that company as commissioners. The third meeting of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners decided that the chair of each meeting would be taken by either the sheriff 
or mayor; if neither were present it would be taken in rotation by members of Cork 
Corporation and other commissioners. It is interesting, in terms of board governance, this 
practice lasted till 1883 when C. J. Cantillon was elected as chairman when the position was 
 
31 McCarthy (1949), p. 29. 
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formally instituted. With the condition of the port uppermost in the commissioners mind the 
meeting on the 1st October 1814 set up a committee to enquire into the state and condition 
of the river. The committee consisted of five members of the board, three of which were 
directors of the Commercial Buildings Company with one member involved in shipping.32 The 
investigation arose out of various complaints by ship users and its terms of reference were: 
“...to enquire into the state and condition of such parts of the river and quays of Cork as 
vessels general load and discharge their cargoes, together with the state and condition of the 
‘New Wall’ …”. The Committee reported on the 15th October “...it is essentially necessary to 
alter the mode in which vessels at present receive their ballast, which is both a disgrace to 
this city and ruinous to those parts of the river where vessels take and discharge their cargo, 
the ballast being suffered to lie in great heaps upon the quays, and banks being formed in the 
line of rubbish accumulated‘’ and that “few of the quays are built with timber framing; the 
large topping stones remain without support or fastening; vessels rising with the tide lift them 
with their guards; the stones fall into the river; the quays become dilapidated and the berths 
where the vessels lie are occupied with masses of stone”. As regards, the ‘New Wall’ the 
committee noted: “.... the removal of the banks lying in every part of the bed of the 
river...requires considerable attention...vessels are inclined to heel upon them to the 
imminent danger to ships and cargo and as shallows, they obstruct the channel so that loaded 
vessels cannot pass at neap tides”.33 The ‘New Wall’ was from 1814, an obsessive subject of 
debate, argument and expense. The committee also highlighted the situation at Blackrock 
 
32 The committee consisted of commissioners Cotter, Callaghan, Goold, Morgan and Bickerton. 
33 Cork and County Archives (CCCA), Cork Harbour Commissioners Collection (PC), minutes of board 
meetings of 1st and 15th October 1814; Cork City Council, Planning Application No.1938589, Custom 
House Tower. Tower Development Properties Ltd, Custom House Quay Development, Environmental 
Impact Assessment Report, p. 114. The Port of Cork Company sold the Custom House Building in 2019 
and the Environmental Report outlines the architectural and engineering development of the city 
quays. (Accessed January 2020).  
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that “...an encroachment has already been made of several feet upon the bed of the river 
where the channel particularly runs, and which, if not looked to, may become of serious 
consequences”.34 This report was very important, as it outlined in detail the actual state of 
the river and quays of Cork and did, in fact, constitute a blueprint for the future work of Cork 
Harbour Commissioners (CHC), particularly, in the nineteenth century. The immediate areas 
of concern were the need for the river to be dredged and secondly, the quay walls needed 
emergency treatment. The basic objectives of the port as regards port maintenance were to 
keep the river channel clear and to secure the quay walls. The board approved of the 
suggestion that Alexander Nimmo carry out a survey of the river and report on suggestions 
for the improvement of navigation.  
CHC was seen to be involved in the business of the port through importing, exporting and 
shipping. The commissioners appointed under the 1813 and 1814 Acts, most of them were 
earning a livelihood from the port, were well aware of the state of the port; in 1813 only small 
vessels drawing 11 feet of water could get to Cork city and then at high water and on berthing 
at Cork they had to be aground on a gravel bottom to discharge. Banks were formed in the 
river at Blackrock and the channel was blocked in places. In terms of quay structure, large 
topping stones were laid without foundations or fastening and more repeatedly deposited in 
the bed of the river by movement of tides and vessels moored alongside.35 Between Passage 
and Cork, it was only 3 feet deep in places with large vessels being unable to proceed to the 
city and having to unload cargo which was taken to Cork subsequently by lighters. Knowing 
that dredging was to be the way of the future, as regards the port, the commissioners in 
February 1815 placed an advertisement seeking “... person or persons ....to contract with the 
 
34 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, 15th October 1814. 
35 McCarthy (1949), pp. 12-13. 
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Board for the removal of the rubbish, earth and stones which have accumulated at the beds 
of the different quays of Cork....”.36 The contract was awarded to Samuel and Andrew Hobbs. 
There was a clear acceptance for the development of the city quays, as there was 
dissatisfaction with the condition of city quays, which manifested itself, in complaints from 
Lloyds Coffee Shop of London in 1815, on behalf of some 64 masters of vessels who were 
trading with Cork. By July of the same year, there was news for the port that Trinity House 
had approved of a lighthouse for Cork Harbour. The lighthouse, which initially was named 
Roche’s Tower, became known as Roche’s Point and a famous landmark for Cork citizens. 
 
4: Alexander Nimmo 1815 
 
The Commission for the Bogs of Ireland was set up in 1809 and was arguably the first attempt 
by the government after the Union to address the infrastructural deficit of Ireland. The 
commission brought to Ireland Alexander Nimmo, a friend of Thomas Telford and until then 
rector of Inverness Academy. He had a major influence in the emergence of the Irish 
Ordnance Survey, the Office of Public Works, the Hydrographic Survey of Ireland and the 
Fisheries Commission.37 Subsequently, Cork Harbour Commissioners engaged Nimmo, to 
investigate as to how the port facilities could be restored. Joseph Pim, a prominent harbour 
commissioner, guaranteed the cost of Nimmo’s survey. The main issues that arose were: 
1: the issue of ballast; 2: the significant gap in the ‘New Wall’; and 3: criticism of quay 
construction. Nimmo’s report, recommended, better river navigation for shipping and a 
 
36 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meetings, February 1815. 
37 See Wilkins, Noel P., Alexander Nimmo, Master Engineer, 1783-1832: Public Works and 
 Civil Surveys, (Dublin, 2009). 
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proposal for a system of wet docks in the city and a canal to the deep-water in Loughmahon. 
He was very critical of the condition of the quays which he referred to as “....mostly imperfect  
masses of rubble stone...”.38 He also referred to “merchant ships lie off Cove or ascend the 
harbour to Passage which is five miles below Cork. Vessels that draw ten or eleven feet of 
water only can go up to the city with spring tides. With neaps, they can go no higher than the 
King’s Quay (Blackrock) about two miles, or in the channel about one mile below the city”. As 
regards the ‘New Wall’ Nimmo questioned the benefits of the Navigation Wall, a view that 
was shared by many others subsequently. Before 1813, many quays were built in a piece- 
meal fashion with individuals carrying out the necessary repairs following permission from 
Cork Corporation and much of this work was carried out between 1800 and 1808. Such quays 
bore the names of the developers-Penrose, Lapp and Anderson. Nimmo’s report identified 
clearly for the commissioners the main structural issues and possible solutions facing the port 
authority. However, the cost was seen to be prohibitive to the commissioners. It is important 
to point out that Nimmo even though he went outside his remit, was able to illustrate to the 
board the natural and man-made difficulties of navigation in the port. Pettit suspected that 
Nimmo was re-designing the whole natural fairway in his proposals but that he was spurred 
on by the “visionary enthusiasms of the time”.39  
By 1816, the city was experiencing an economic slump with agricultural prices declining by up 
to half wartime prices and Cork, no longer hosted Royal Navy fleets and with that scenario, 
the provision trade was badly affected. There was a feeling that the cost of infrastructure 
could not be undertaken without parliamentary aid and to implement some of Nimmo’s 
 
38 Nimmo, Alexander, Report to the Harbour Commissioners on the Means of Improving the 
 River and Harbour of Cork (Cork, 1815). 
39 Pettit (1996), pp. 23, 26-7 and 44; Pettit (1986), p. 6. 
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recommendations, in 1816, grant aid was requested on behalf of Cork Corporation and Cork 
Harbour Commissioners but was turned down by the Lord Lieutenant on the advice of the 
Chief Secretary for Ireland, Robert Peel. In the delegation that met Peel, CHC was represented 
by Gerard Callaghan, who was prominent in Cork business circles; Cork Corporation was 
represented by Aldermen Newsom and Evanson, together with Sheriff Deane. Whilst this 
decision was disappointing, more so, was the fact that Waterford, with a similar petition, was 
successful in getting funding and, funding of Cork port, Peel argued, should be raised at local 
level.40 This request for aid was the first with which the commissioners were associated with. 
In the submission, there was mention of the progress of the ‘New Wall’ until 1790 and how 
“internal disquiet and agitation in Ireland had so interrupted all public works”. This reference 
was to the French War and the 1798 rebellion. In the submission for funding, it was noted; 
“....established packets hired by and under the control of Government plying between it and 
Bristol...principal port ...embark and debark troops...that generally the baggage of the 
regiments is shipped from and landed at the quays of Cork...that the coal trade is carried on 
exclusively by English vessels, which being very frequently prevented working up to Cork by 
strong westerly winds, rapid floods and the shallowness of the river, suffer considerable 
detention, while the inhabitants also suffer from want of fuel”.41 A more significant point was 
raised in the submission, in relation to the nomination of the ‘Weighmasters of Butter and 
Hides’, the fees belonging to such offices and “which was the undoubted right of the 
Corporation was assumed by the Irish Parliament in 1723 and the fees received by persons 
appointed by Parliament used for their own private benefit until the year 1813”. From 1813 
 
40 For the Waterford perspective see Breen, Mary, Waterford port and harbour,1815-42, 
(Dublin,2019), pp.18-20. 
41 Leland, Mary, The Endless Adventure, History of Cork Harbour Commissioners (Cork, 2001), p. 43; 
McCarthy, Cal, Cork Harbour (Dublin, 2019) p. 111.  
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revenue was used to support the Weighhouse and city improvements and it was further 
pointed out that the revenue raised between 1723 and 1813, which amounted to, £130,000, 
could have been used for the completion of the ‘New Wall’ along with other developments; 
it was also pointed out that 1/3 of yearly income was applicable to the improvement of the 
river but that 1/3 would not be sufficient in meeting the annual expense of maintaining the 
quays.42 It was argued that during the twenty years of war Cork Corporation did not require 
payment from any privately owned vessel, engaged in public service, in respect of “legal 
anchorage and ballast dues” and that such sums would have been quite significant.  
 The Deane brothers in the autumn of 1817 were involved in the resumed work on the ‘New 
Wall’ with 400 personnel employed and this included, masons, stone cutters and labourers. 
Thomas Deane was an architect and Alexander, a contractor. The Deane brothers became 
very influential in the affairs of Cork Harbour Commissioners. In carrying out the protracted 
work on the city quays a vast amount of work lay ahead: a large part of Merchants Quay had 
fallen into the river; Charlotte Quay, now Fr. Mathew Quay needed urgent attention; Victoria 
Quay still needed to be built as did the depot for later cross-channel steamer traffic. Penrose, 
Patrick’s, George’s, and Pope’s quays all needed urgent attention. Nimmo in his report had 
specifically asked that Merchants Quay be under-pinned and piled along 532 yards. By April 
1818, portion of the quay was re-built by the Deane brothers, but some 300 feet still needed 
to be completed. A tender was advertised in relation to the building of nearly 200 feet and 
three tenders were received with the contract being awarded to one of the Deane brothers, 
Alexander. The work to be carried out was to give the ‘New Wall’ a gradual and impressive 
increase of breadth so that the quay near the Custom House could be widened by ten feet. 
 
42 Under the 1813 Act one third (1/3) of the fees received by the Weighmaster from the 
 butter trade in the city went to the Cork Harbour Commissioners. 
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5: Cork Harbour Act 1820  
 
In 1819 consideration was being given by Cork Harbour Commissioners and Cork Corporation 
to the passage through parliament of a Ballast Act. On the same issue, the Committee of 
Merchants and the ship owners of the city called a meeting regarding the proposed act; 
however, it was to decide the number of commissioners to be appointed in future. Julius 
Besnard, as the board’s law agent, was sent to London to oversee the legislation being 
enacted. His family were influential members of the ‘Friendly Club’ with several members 
holding the ex-officio offices of sheriff and mayor in Cork Harbour Commissioners (CHC). The 
bill received royal assent in July 1820.43 
This was the most significant piece of legislation relating to Cork Harbour Commissioners since 
they were established and would remain important until the passing of the 1946 Harbours 
Act. The significant features of the act included: 
1: Extensive powers were given to Cork Harbour Commissioners for the improvement of the 
river and port. 
2: A Harbour Master was to be appointed along with power to license pilots. 
3: The commissioners were confirmed to meet as a body and “keep records of proceedings”. 
4: The board had power to regulate all traffic in the port and river and to make bye-laws for 
the rates of all shipping. Under the act, CHC could impose duties on imports and exports and 
this led to an increase in income of 100% between 1822 and 1829 albeit from a low base.  
5: There were to be sanctions on masters of vessels guilty of throwing coal, rubbish, stones 
and gravel into the river. 
 
43 Cork Harbour Act 1820. (1. Geo.iv.c.52); O’Riordan, Patrick, Portraiture of Cork Harbour  
   Commissioners (Cork, 2015), P. 288. 
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Following the passing of this legislation, the commissioners appointed John Cotter and Henry 
Hardy, treasurer and secretary respectively.44 Cotter was a director of the Commercial 
Buildings Company, sheriff in 1804 and a prominent member of the ‘Friendly Club’. The 
commissioners later in 1820 set about securing permanent premises for the board as up to 
then meetings were held in the old Mansion House (the residence of the mayor and the 
municipal offices). Later the commissioners met at the Commercial Buildings Offices, of which 
many of them were directors. For the building of the premises on Lapps Quay CHC received 
tenders in the names of Leycester, Foley, Doyle and Hall. Leycester was the successful bidder. 
The Leycester family became prominent members of Cork Harbour Commissioners with 
Robert Leycester being a commissioner from November 1821 to October 1822 in an ex-officio 
capacity as sheriff. The Leycesters were prominent members of the ‘Friendly Club’.  
At this time, the commissioners set about structuring the pilotage system in a more formal 
manner and a public notice was mentioned in the newspapers of August 1820. By December 
the board had set out its first schedule of pilotage rates. In setting out the regulations relating 
to pilotage it was clear that at this stage those vessels of over 220 tons were not capable of 
being received at the Cork quays thus emphasizing the river restrictions and the need for 
improvement. The year 1820 witnessed the appointment of the first harbour master along 
with deputies for Cove and Passage. Significantly, the 1820 Act allowed the commissioners to 
benefit from additional income accruing which rose significantly to nearly £7,000 in 1822. 
 
6: Early Port Developments and  a view of The Port in 1846 
 
The 1820’s saw work progressing slowly on the refurbishment of the city quays, mainly under 
 
44 Henry Hardy was the secretary of Cork Harbour Commissioners from 1814 to 1847. 
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 the direction of the Deane Brothers, and the commissioners began to turn their attention to 
the need to deepen the river between Passage and the Custom House. The commissioners, 
at a meeting of the 8th March 1821, engaged Mr John Killally, a Government Surveyor,45 to 
complete a report but again, the cost was beyond the resources of CHC. His report being a 
modification of Nimmo’s report. He proposed to build a canal to improve the navigation of 
large vessels from Passage to Cork at a cost of €103,500, however, by June the board had 
referred to Killaly’s plan as “inexpedient to execute”.  
This period in time saw what Pettit referred to as a development that was to transform “the 
traffic of the sea as dramatically as the railways did on land”; steamboats had arrived on the 
Lee and this was seen when there was a request for boats to have exclusive berths for lying 
at Merchants Quay.46 But steam was bringing its disadvantages as was experienced in 1828 
when a letter from the ship owners and merchants of the city requested the commissioners 
to enact a bye-law to protect shipping interests as steamers were using excessive power.  
 With finances scarce, this had the effect that between 1820 and 1833 repairs could only be 
carried out as money allowed. Nonetheless, the commissioners could see that the major 
investment required was to invest in dredging to overcome the limitations in the depth of the 
channel and indeed, the city quays. The size of ship coming upriver was limited and then there 
was the question of the lighters in Passage which had to be used because of the inadequacy 
of the channel. 
In 1836, Jacob Owen carried out a survey on behalf of the commissioners, of the channel 
between Blackrock and Cork city. He recommended the completion of the ‘New Wall’ as far 
as Kings Quay and in the same year, the board were discussing the possibility of a rail  
 
45 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meetings, June 1821. 
46 Pettit (1996), p. 23. 
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connection from Cork city to Passage.47 The railway companies brought a new dynamic to  
Cork, however, it is important to put the commissioner’s role in context as it could be 
described as one of giving support but also, the need for due diligence, particularly when the 
harbour interest was at stake. An example was when land for rail tracks was required by the 
railway companies and on occasion, this conflicted with the position of the commissioners. In 
relation to that period, Saunders stated that “... a race was now on between port 
accommodation and draught and length of ships. Cork was in the race along with other 
ports”.48 Almost two centuries later Cork is still trying to find a solution to that problem. 
By November 1840 CHC had invested in their first crane and by 1842 they were reacting to 
unprecedented unemployment in the city with extra labourers been employed which 
increased labour inputs into the harbour maintenance work. Just as the commissioners were 
reaching the mid-point of the century there was an independent analysis recorded of the 
physical and economic state of the harbour.49 The salient points were: the state of the 
harbour ….showed the port in a very backward state; quays extending from St Patricks Bridge 
in the north channel and Parliament Bridge in the south channel to about 200 yards east of 
the Custom House Quay, were built on the strand, the foundations being at low water level; 
the depth of water in the centre of the channel was from 4 1/2 to 6 feet. There were no 
lighthouses or buoys to mark the channels and at that time only vessels of 15 feet draft could 
only get to Cork on spring tides and at neap tides, only 12 feet draft vessels could get up. At 
 
47 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, 27th April 1836.  
48 Saunders, F.O’C, ‘The Development of the River Port of Cork City’, The Institution of Civil 
 Engineers of Ireland, vol. 82, March 1956, p. 120. 
49 Coakley, D J. Cork: Its Trade and Commerce (Cork, 1919), p. 84; Ordnance Survey map 1841 
1:10.,5060 map, Co. Cork sheet 74 and Ordnance Survey map 1869 1:10,1056 map, Cork City sheets 
74-46 and -56, in Cork City Council, Planning Application No.1938589, Custom House Tower. Tower 
Development Properties Ltd, Custom House Quay Development, Environmental Impact Assessment 
Report, p. 114.See Appendix 1.2 Map of Cork Port and Harbour  mid 19th century. 
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Cork quays, all vessels had to lie aground and the large vessels would have to lie some distance 
from the quay. All overseas vessels had to anchor at Passage where about half the cargo was 
discharged into lighters to be taken to Cork with the subsequent extra cost to merchants.  
 
7: Port finances 1800-1850 
 
Cork Harbour Commissioners income derived from the following main sources, tonnage rates, 
imports and exports charges. With no capital funding forthcoming from the Government and 
having been told that any maintenance should be financed from the port’s resources, it was 
not the most auspicious of starts for the new harbour authority.  
One third of the fees (1/3) from the butter industry, under the 1813 Act, received by the 
Weighmaster went to CHC with the purpose “to be by them expended in deepening widening  
and improving the harbour and river of Cork’’.50 For the financial year, 31st July 1814, 1/3 of 
butter proceeds amounted to £499 and based on the quarter February returns it can be 
estimated that CHC income amounted to £576 in respect of 1815. McCarthy has estimated 
that the income from the butter receipts in subsequent years reached £700.51 The 1813 Act 
was repealed under the 1820 Act.52The 1820 Act was a start as regards financial control and 
within a few years, the commissioners wanted their financial affairs audited annually. Whilst 
the records of the period from 1820 have been lost in a fire, it is possible to put together a 
financial picture of CHC. The 1820 Act allowed the commissioners to raise tonnage and goods 
income that was not applicable under the 1813 Act with the result that income in respect of 
 
50 The Butter Weighhouse Act of 1813. (53.Geo, 111.c.70). 
51 McCarthy, Patrick J, ‘An Economic History of the Port of Cork: 1813-1900’ (unpublished 
 M. EconSc. thesis, University College Cork, 1949) p. 41. 
52 O’Riordan (2015), p. 288. 
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the year 1822 amounted to £6,894. Table 1. 1 shows an analysis of income for the years 1822-
1832.  
Outside of the tonnage and goods income from butter, there does not seem to be any other 
significant income. There was no financial structure in place during this period particularly as 
finances were in the hands of agents.  
 
Table 1. 1 Cork Harbour Commissioners Income 1822-1932 
Year Total Income +/-% 
1822 £6894  
1830 £7872 14%: (1830-1822). 
1831 £8172 18%: (1831-1822). 
1832 £6655 -3%; (1832-1822). 
Source: Pettit (1996); McCarthy (1949); O’Riordan, Patrick, Portraiture of Cork  
Harbour Commissioners (Cork, 2015); CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners,  
annual accounts and minutes of board meetings, 1822-1832. 
 
Ballast income has been recorded in gross terms for all years except for 1848 and 1849 when 
the surplus was shown under income. This distorts any analysis of ballast income for the 
period 1830-1849. Similarly, in 1849 total income amounts to £14,018 which includes a 
miscellaneous once-off receipt of £2,650. Table 1. 2 shows an analysis of income for the years 
1835-1849.  
Revenue from imports suffered badly during the years 1832-1835 and as mentioned rates 
were reduced in 1832 by 25% reflecting the commissioner’s concern. Income varied from 
£1,218 in 1832 to £1,511 in 1835. Income began to increase in the remaining period of the 
decade, but it was not till 1840 that there was a marked improvement; with income increasing 
from £2,456 in 1840 to £5,036 in 1849. Imports in the period 1830--1849 increased by 147% 
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and of which, 77% applied to the years 1845-1849. The increase can be attributed to grain 
and feedstuffs imported during the famine period. The increase in income during the review 
period is primarily due to imports, which on average, amounted to 27% of total income.  
Export income in respect of 1835 amounted to £1,076 which was the lowest figure in the 
1835-1849 period and when CHC reduced their rates in 1845 income rose to £2,604 but had 
declined to £1,843 by 1849.  
From a base income of £1,660 in 1830 tonnage income gradually increased reaching £3,970 
in 1849, reflecting a 139% increase. 
 
Table 1. 2 Cork Harbour Commissioners income 1835-1849 
Year Imports Exports Tonnage Total % 
  £ £ £ £ Total Income 
1835 1511 1076 2140 4727 64 
1840 2456 2018 2751 7225 78 
1845 2833 2604 3133 8570 87 
1849 5036 1843 3970 10849 77 
            
Source: Pettit (1996); McCarthy (1949); O’Riordan, Patrick, Portraiture of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners (Cork, 2015); CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, annual accounts and minutes 
of board meetings, 1835-1849. 
 
An analysis of expenditure is shown in Table 1. 3. A major cost over the period under review 
was quays which increased by 96% and, it was no surprise to find that dredging costs had 
increased by 184% during the same period. Quay expenditure along with dredging costs 
consistently amounted to over 60% of total expenditure during the review period. This 
expenditure mostly related to the upper river. Salaries costs declined to 5% of total costs as 
did rents going from 5% to 3%. Ballast costs were consistently over 21% during the period of 
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review, however, with no amounts shown under expenditure in 1849, as the surplus/profit 
was shown under income, this had the effect of distorting the analysis of ballast and indeed, 
total expenditure. The second quarter of the nineteenth century was an important phase of 
development and investment for the port, and many of the quays built remain in situ and 
constitute a defining feature of the port’s history.  
 
Table 1. 3 Cork Harbour Commissioners Expenditure 1830-1849 
YEAR QUAYS DREDGING RENTS SALARIES BALLAST TOTAL 
  % % % % % % 
1830 54 12 5 8 15 94 
1835 42 13 6 7 28 96 
1840 15 46 6 7 21 95 
1845 34 29 4 6 21 94 
1849 65 22 3 5 0 95 
Source: Pettit (1996); McCarthy (1949); O’Riordan, Patrick, Portraiture of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners (Cork, 2015); CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, annual accounts and minutes 
of board meetings, 1830-1849. 
  
8: The Shadow of the Famine and Emigration 
 
The Irish economy was crippled by the failure of the potato. The crop of 1845 failed as a result 
of potato blight with the subsequent famine bringing disease and death to Ireland, thereby,  
reducing the population and having far reaching economic and social effects. In respect of the 
port, the famine had economic consequences which were reflected in changes that took place 
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in the merchant class and this, in turn, had an effect on the general character of the port 
which led to the near extinction of the general merchant as a ship owner.53 
The twenty year period, 1845-1865, was to witness a phenomenal growth in cross-channel 
steamer traffic, principally in the carriage of passengers and cattle and the harbour was to 
become famous as a major transatlantic port of call, however, more immediately the shadow 
of the famine was to fall over the Port of Cork. Following the repeal of the Corn Laws, the 
then Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel authorised the importation into Ireland of corn, including 
Indian corn from the United States to alleviate the distress of the Irish people. By 1846 Peel 
had set up the Relief Commission to organise local committees, landlords, clergy and 
businessmen to raise subscriptions to buy and distribute food; local employment schemes 
were put in place as was, the building of fever hospitals. Peel ordered, without cabinet or 
parliament approval, £100,000 of Indian corn to be delivered to depots in Ireland from the 
United States.  
Relief of communities can be traced as far back as the 1820’s with officers and ratings 
stationed in Ireland requesting that a portion of their wages be allocated for the relief of 
‘distress’ in Irish coastal communities.54 Still, the harbour authority must have been aware of 
the social conditions that prevailed in the city, particularly with unemployment high during 
the 1830’s; in May 1837 the commissioners decided “... in consequence of the number of 
labourers who are unable to procure work in this City, and of the high price of provisions....” 
to authorise the placing of one hundred labourers clearing the river in front of the ‘New Wall’ 
with the proviso they had to be residents of Cork. By June 1842 meetings of the 
commissioners were dealing with the whole question of unemployment, for example, at the 
 
53 Pettit (1996), p.150. 
54 Brunicardi, Daire, Haulbowline: The naval base and ships of Cork Harbour (Dublin, 2002), p. 39. 
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request of Mayor Thomas Lyons, there was agreement that 150 labourers be employed with 
each person applying for work to produce a recommendation from a commissioner; each 
commissioner was to have the power to recommend six resident labourers and as well, the 
applicants should be the head of the family.55 Following on, in less than a week, 200 more 
workers were to be employed and a further 430 by the end of the month.56 This is reminiscent 
of a programme of work that was in operation in the port each Christmas and lasted well into 
the 1970’s/1980’s and became known as Christmas Relief work with the politicians of the day 
recommending individuals to the harbour authority for work. Maybe, it was coincidence or 
otherwise, it was the same faces that turned up for work each year. 
Biscuits and oats were stored in the Ordnance Depot in Haulbowline with naval magazines 
being used for storing Indian corn. Reflecting the inadequacies of Cork and its port, the ships 
that arrived could only discharge part of their cargo at Haulbowline and would have to be 
further lightened at Passage before proceeding to Cork. Part of the problem was getting the 
corn milled and this caused considerable movement from seagoing ships to the mills, which 
were mostly in Cork city, and from there back down to Haulbowline for distribution around  
 the coast. To all intents and purposes, the navy was acting as an aid to the civilian  
authority.57 As people left, food ships sailed into Cork city, as early as 1846 with consignments 
of Indian corn from the USA and as these vessels arrived in Cork harbour they often had to 
wait for 2 weeks as the preparation for milling and distribution was incomplete.58 
Yet it was not until 1846 that the commissioners, judging from the board minutes, became 
concerned with the famine catastrophe. The Commissary General, Hewetson, asked for 
 
55 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, 10th June 1842.  
56 Ibid, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meetings of 15th and 29th June 1842. 
57 Brunicardi, p. 40. 
58 Pettit (1996), p. 179. 
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remission in dues payable on cargoes. He was responsible for receiving, unloading, storing, 
drying, milling and dispatching supplies of Indian corn, the board agreed that the American 
relief food vessels arriving in Cork would have their dues remitted and among, the vessels 
arriving was the American sloop ‘‘Jamestown’’ from Boston.  
The significance of the hardship that the famine had brought was highlighted to the 
commissioners when a labourer, employed by them, died as a result of famine fever.59 By 
May 1846, there was a request from a local famine relief committee which was offering an 
interest free loan of £1,000 for 12 months on the basis that it should be spent in 3 months on 
additional work requiring labour. 
The Quaker business and religious connections proved to be important factors during the 
famine and none more so than in Cork, when there was a relief committee set up under 
Ebenezer Pike who had been appointed to look after the city and the committee included 
names such as Carroll and Newsom, who were prominent commissioners.60 With Pike, as 
chairman of Cork Harbour Commissioners, he proposed and authorised an increase in wages 
to be paid at nine shillings rather than eight shillings a week for labourers. The end of the 
month saw the board agree that 50 extra labourers be given work at 14 pence a day and that 
all necessary gangers to be paid 16 pence with work to commence on the ‘New Wall’.61 By 
December of 1846, the board agreed payment to labourers for a full week at Christmas 
including holy days with the implication being that only for the famine there would be no  
 
 
59 £5 was to be paid to the widow of Daniel Lane a labourer with CHC who had been employed for 
 22 years. 
60 Harrisson, Richard S., Merchants, Mystics and Philanthropists, 350 years of Cork Quakers 
 (Cork, 2006), pp. 90 and 118. 
61 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, 7th October 1846.  
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payment for holy days.62 Where there was famine emigration was not far behind. 
From the Great Famine, emigration accelerated. Small numbers had emigrated in the 18th  
century and they mainly came from Ulster. An estimated 68,000 sailed from Irish ports in 1844 
for a new start in America, with an estimated 2 million leaving between 1845 and 1855 and 
up to 70,000 emigrating from Cork city between 1845 and 1851. The general practice was to 
travel by steamer to Liverpool and embark for America but firstly, several days had to be 
endured in the city. After 1851, Cove emerged as an emigrant port due primarily to the arrival 
of the transatlantic steamship companies, making the harbour an important point of 
transatlantic departure and arrival thereafter. In 1857, Inman Line was first to arrive making 
the calls to Queenstown and became a regular caller by 1859 with ships calling the day after 
leaving Liverpool to embark cabin passengers and mail, subsequently, it began to take 
steerage passengers. A huge benefit to Queenstown was announced in 1859 when it was to 
become a port of call for the Royal Mail Steamers.63 
In economic terms, there was a profitable trade in timber from North America, which  
increased the number of transatlantic voyages and to solve the problem of ballast caused by 
the inability of the timber ships to find suitable cargoes for North America, minimal changes 
were made and the ships were able to carry people as outward cargo. An early mention of a 
ship coming to Cork for passengers bound for the United States was in April 1845 when there 
was a request by a merchant for a reduction in tonnage rates on the vessel “Ocean”. Whilst 
 
62 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, 23rd. December 1846. 
Referring to Indian Corn, the phrase “present scarcity”, used in the minutes, is an understatement of 
the situation that pertained in Cork.  
63 In 1859 Cork Harbour Commissioners received confirmation from the UK government that 
Queenstown was to be made a port of call for the Royal Mail Steamers and that the British and 
North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Company was to deliver and receive the mails. 
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the board on that occasion refused the application, they were more accommodating when 
the number of ships arriving into port increased. 
Even with the shadow of the famine over the harbour, port developments continued. 
  
9: Shipbuilding in Cork port  
 
The first Irish made paddle steamer was launched on the 15th June 1815 at Passage by 
Andrew Hennessy, who designed and built “The City of Cork”. A dry dock was built in Browne’s 
yard in Passage in 1830 and along with Robinson’s yard, built most of the Atlantic and 
Continental trade with Wheeler’s yard concentrating on ship repairs. Brown’s close rival 
Robinson was getting orders from England which involved ships that varied from sail to steam. 
The success of the shipping industry can be seen that by 1840 aggregate registered  
tonnage, in the port, was 32,000 and by 1854 was over 50,000. By the 1850’s it has been 
estimated that 1,500 to 2,000 jobs were employed in the industry. The industry was boosted 
by factors such as the emergence of the steam packet era and the war involvement, 
nevertheless, the technology of the Cork yards was primarily a timber based one and unlike, 
Belfast, never adapted to the age of iron.64 Still, merchants in the second half of the century 
relied on clippers which were fast and sharp built sailing vessels which held off competition 
for some years.65 Eventually, the period saw the arrival of steam powered transport; 
nevertheless, steam was regarded as slow in displacing sail. The middle of the 19th century 
saw shipbuilding in Cork at its peak. Eventually, there was a decline in the construction of 
ships with the last steamship built in Cork in 1861 and repair work was then only carried on 
 
64 Dickson, David, Old World Colony, Cork and South Munster 1630-1830 (Cork, 2005), p. 409; Pettit 
(1996), p. 60. 
65 Pettit (1996), pp. 61 and 94. 
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in the harbour. As well, the West Indies market had reached its peak by the 1850's and 
collapsed by 1864. 
By 1854, Robinson had launched the 210-ton brig ‘’John Harley’’ for Harley’s of Patrick’s Quay 
and 1855 saw the yard building a 1,220-ton iron steamer for the Malcolmson’s of Portlaw. 
Needless to mention these were examples of keeping contracts within Quaker networks. 
George Robinson went on to build in 1857 the largest iron steamer, at that time, and a 
dredger was also built for Cork Harbour Commissioners (CHC) in 1859 and four iron barges 
were also being built for the harbour authority. By 1860 George Wheeler completed the 
Rushbrook Docks and had sold his Lower Glanmire Road Dockyard to George Robinson, who 
had built various vessels for the Hardy’s of Cork. 
It was not just in the major towns that shipbuilding was taking place. The Malcolmson mill in 
Portlaw had ship production as a by-product of the local economy in Waterford.66 The 
merchant houses of Cork were associated with the shipbuilding industry and it could be 
argued that the demise of the industry came about as a result of the middlemen being 
undercut between wholesalers and cross channel suppliers particularly with the arrival of the 
steam packets.67 As well, it must be seen that Cork lost its supremacy in shipbuilding due to 
principally not being able to move with the changing times and this, it could be argued, was 
neglect or even, incompetence. Cork had been to the forefront in shipbuilding developments 
which ranged from paddle-steamers to the ‘’Sirius’’.  
Industrial decline in the hinterland of Cork deprived the engineering industry of vital linkages 
from other industries in the region and not having necessary deposits of coal and steel found 
 
66 McCann, Gerard, Ireland’s Economic History: Crisis and Development in the North and 
 South (London, 2011), p. 43. Joseph Malcolmson was a major shareholder in the Cork Steamship 
Company. 
67 Dickson (2005), p. 409. 
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its industry in stagnation and shipbuilding went into decline.68 It was only in areas such as the 
brewing, distilling, butter and bacon trades, that any significant profits were made, reflecting 
the strong industrial links to the city’s agricultural hinterland.  
Few businessmen of international calibre emerged in post-famine Ireland. In the case of 
Belfast, immigrant businessmen made a major contribution to the city’s economic 
development. Shipbuilding in Belfast was originally established by William Ritchie from Ayr, 
in Scotland. The famous Harland and Wolff shipyard was founded by Edward Harland, an 
Englishman and G. W. Wolff an English educated German. Belfast had become the hub of the 
shipping building industry by the 1860’s.  
 
10: Advent of Steam  
 
Steam imposed and brought a different urgency to loading and unloading as shorter voyages 
and the new mail traffic came to the forefront and there was also the race between port 
accommodation, draught and length of ships. It was clear that trading patterns were changing 
and an erosion of the supremacy of the port in supply terms was gradually happening. The 
first passenger steamer was the “Clermont” which sailed between New York and Albany in 
1806; the “Comet” was the pioneering vessel launched on the Clyde and sailed between 
Helensburgh and Glasgow. There was a transition from sail to steam and on to iron and this 
change to iron was much quicker and by 1850, iron-built ships were in demand.69 By 1872, 
steel used in shipbuilding had introduced a great improvement in speed reliability and 
regularity, especially when fitted with the new compound engine and surface condenser.  
 
68 Bielenberg, Andy, Cork’s Industrial Revolution: 1780-1880 (Cork, 1991), p.114. 
69 McCarthy, Patrick J, ‘An Economic History of the Port of Cork: 1813-1900’ (unpublished 
 M. EconSc. thesis, University College Cork, 1949), p. 8. 
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To summarise, the shipbuilding industry was marked by economic success, flourishing in the 
1850’s and declining from the late 1860’s. This was partly due to a lack of capital and failure 
to adapt the local wooden shipbuilding skills to the newly developed methods of iron 
shipbuilding. Local yards failed to compete with English and Scottish operations and even 
though some yards won Admiralty contracts it did little to boost the industry in the long term. 
By its nature, the shipbuilding industry was subject to fluctuations.70 
To get an overview of the shipping industry it is important to look at some of the companies 
that made up that sector. St George Steam Packet Company was established in the early 
1820’s and was one of the ‘’first steam navigation ventures in maritime history’’.71 By 1835 
all of the company’s vessels were registered in Dublin. Joseph Robinson Pim, who was the 
founder of the company in 1821, along with his brother-in-law R.J. Lecky, the Cork shipbuilder 
and they were later joined by Charles Wye Williams. The first ships built were the “St. Patrick” 
and the “St. George” which were built by the Cork man Thomas J. Wilson who subsequently 
opened his own yard in Liverpool. James Beale was another well-known director of the 
company and became a prominent member of Cork Harbour Commissioners.  
Pim had encouraged English businessmen to join the company as directors but they did not 
understand or appreciate the cross-channel trade. Towards the end of the company’s life 
shareholders were finding it difficult to get an adequate return on their capital investment. 
The “Sirius” was a 703 gross ton vessel and the first ship to cross the Atlantic entirely under 
steam, which sailed to New York in 1838 with 40 passengers and beat the much larger “Great 
 
70 Cronin, M., 'Work and workers in Cork City and County 1800-1900', in P. O'Flanagan and 
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 Irish County, (Dublin, 1993), p. 733. 
71 Pettit (1996), pp. 79, 87 and 93. 
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Western” by a few hours; the vessel was a wooden side-wheel steamship owned by the St 
George Steam Packet Company.  
The St. George’s regular trade was in passengers, goods and cattle between Cork, Dublin, 
Liverpool, Bristol and London with two of its vessels, the “Lee” and “Severn”, trading directly 
from Cork. The two vessels had been placed on the Liverpool and Bristol routes in 1824. 
Meanwhile, reflecting the success of the shipping line in 1825 Cork Harbour Commissioners 
granted exclusive berth rights in respect of the steamboat “Lee”. By 1837 the company had 
vessels trading to Dublin, Bristol, Liverpool and London and by the mid 1840’s there was a 
fleet of 7,500-ton steam vessels. However, by 1844 the St. George Company was merged into 
the Cork Steam Ship Company.72 The capital of the Cork Steam Ship Company was £170,000 
in £100 shares and in 1847 the first screw-steamer “Blarney” was built by Lecky for the 
company. Pike seeing the need for ship repairs promoted a ship repair yard at Hargraves Quay 
and helped Cork be more independent of the English repair yards. The Cork Steam Ship 
Company or Pike’s yard, as it became better known, was the largest shipbuilding operation in  
Cork city with a staff of about 200 employed and a monthly wage bill of £200.73 By 1852 almost 
370 workers were employed. 
The success of Cork shipping can be illustrated by examining the shipping register for Cork in 
1849; the numbers of vessels were 109 and the tonnage was 50,363 tons. Of the vessels 23 
were steamers and of those 9 were iron built with ten of the largest vessels owned by Cork 
Steam Ship Company. Ships were built for the cross-channel line but by 1861 all its vessels 
were built in England with the repair work kept for Cork, however, by 1868 fire had destroyed 
 
72 The directors of the company included names such as Pike, Hayes, Gould, Lane and Connell, all well-
known harbour commissioners. 
73 Cork Examiner, 3rd July 1848.  
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the whole operation. Pike, by this time, was an influential member of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners and other harbour companies. With shipbuilding not revived in Pike’s yard, 
Robinson dominated with iron shipbuilding in the city during the 1860’s, and the lower 
harbour yards concentrated on repairs.74 Robinson sold his Water Street premises to Cork 
Harbour Commissioners, the contract was completed in 1877. Robinson’s shipbuilding yard 
at the Lower Road was converted into workshops, stores and a yard. Barry’s timber merchants 
bought the premises in the late 20th century; by then the premises had become superfluous 
to the needs of the board, as a lot of the activities at ‘the Yard’ were carried out in Tivoli which 
had become, along with Ringaskiddy, the centre of Cork Harbour Commissioners operations. 
There was criticism of the shipping industry by newspapers reporting that “...vast amount of 
money spent on repairing old and antiquated vessels and the fleet as a whole is inefficient 
and defective and quite unfit for the requirements of the port”.75 By the 1870’s the coming 
into being of the limited liability laws allowed Pike to divide the company into two and this 
primarily came about as a result of the success of Cork shipping. Two distinct companies came 
out of the St George Steam Packet Company and Cork Steamship Company merger with the 
Continental Lines known as Cork Steam Ship Company and the Home Lines became City of 
Cork Steam Packet Company Ltd, which was largely controlled by Unionists.76 The City of Cork 
Steam Packet Company Ltd. through various commercial experiences was eventually taken 
over by the B and I Line in 1936. 
So, in general, the decline in shipping came about as a result of the following factors: 
 
74 Pettit (1996), pp. 65-67 
75  Cork Examiner, 9th July 1875. 
76 d’Alton, Ian, ‘Keeping faith: an evocation of the Cork protestant character 1820-1920’ 
 in P. O'Flanagan and C. G. Buttimer (eds.), Cork History and Society. Interdisciplinary Essays on 
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The ports Atlantic trade after 1864 collapsed and it was cheaper to send goods to 
London/Liverpool by steamer for transhipment rather than waiting for a full cargo load in 
Cork; Belfast’s proximity to the Clyde and British coal and iron supplies gave it advantages 
over Cork port.77 Ship repairs continued in the Port of Cork. 
 
11: Dredging development in the 19th Century  
 
The commissioners, in August 1824, had received a report from Henry Price on the possibility 
of excavating by a steam dredging machine. Price had brought such a machine over from 
London and had completed work for Waterford port. By December the steam machine was 
working in Cork port and this led to the commissioners advertising for one to be purchased 
for their own use. The advertisement was looking for a machine that could be “used for 
dredging rivers”. Investment in dredging equipment was to be the initial priority of CHC and 
the first dredger was purchased from Shoreham Harbour Authority (a 12hp machine), the cost 
was less than the price advertised; within two years the upper channel had been deepened 
to allow up to the city quays ships with a draught of 7 feet, at neap tides and over 16 feet at 
spring tides and as Saunders pointed out such vessels “...could pass freely up to the city 
berths…” and this, of course, was dependent on prevailing winds.78 
By 1828 23,000 tons had been raised and by 1832 182,877 tons had been dredged; a second 
dredger was bought in 1839 in order to accelerate the deepening of the riverbed, but it was 
still the case that certain Austrian vessels and almost all-American ships could not reach the 
city quays. 
 
77 See Bielenberg, Andy, Cork’s Industrial Revolution: 1780-1880 (Cork, 1991); Pettit (1996), p. 67. 
78 Saunders (1956), p. 120. 
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There were drawbacks to the new machine in that the dredged material was dumped behind 
the Navigation Wall. There was continuous pressure on the board to improve the port and its 
facilities even where it did not have all the financial resources required. A major development 
in this area was the decision to build a dock and quay premises on land owned by William 
Penrose and between 1827 and 1834 £34,000 was spent on the quay; with CHC forced to 
issue debentures in payment of some of its debt. The dredged output by the year 1849 was 
costing 4 1/2d per ton.79 Cork could not buy a dredger of the same class or size as Belfast did, 
due to their financial situation. Still, the dredged material was being dumped behind the 
Navigation Wall and this was being swept out to the riverbed again. There was also pressure 
on the commissioners arising from the new steam powered schedules. Another dredger was 
built in 1851 at the local Lecky’s yard at a cost of £5,600 and this was to deepen the channel 
from Blackrock to Cork and was to be known as the “Lee”. The dredged material was put into 
wooden barges from which it was wheeled ashore at considerable expense to form the 
Marina embankment. Sheet piling was carried out in 1855 to allow dredging from 5ft to 7ft at 
low tide for all quays. By 1857 a fourth dredger was bought and for the next seven years piling 
was carried out allowing dredging of 7 and 8 feet at low water along the quays.80 Between 
1857 and 1864 a total length of 18,580 feet of quays was piled.81 Dredging was carried on to 
produce a channel 11 feet deep from Horse Head (near Passage) to Cork but progress must 
have been slow with the old shovel barge method, as soundings taken in 1874 show the depth 
was only 9 feet in places.  
 
79 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, annual accounts and minutes of board meetings, 1848-
1849. The cost was £27,816.16.7 with 1,277,502 tons dredged. 
80 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, details extracted from various board minutes, 1837-1857.  
81 Saunders (1956), p. 122. 
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In 1865 Cork Harbour Commissioners sent their Mechanical Engineer to the Clyde to look at 
their system of dredging by hopper barges. This was regarded as the way forward and four 
steam hoppers were subsequently, built for the commissioners by Robinsons of Cork between 
1867 and 1871.82 In 1867 the dredging operation consisted of the dredgers delivering into the 
barges from which the spoil was barrowed ashore to back up the ‘New Wall’. Deepening of 
the channel from Horse Head to the Custom House, which had commenced in 1867, was 
completed in 1873 to a depth of 11ft l.w.os.t. (low water at spring tides). By September 1870 
dredged material was amounting to 1,200 tons per week.83 In 1874 the first attempt was 
made to allow overseas vessels to discharge afloat at Cork, this required dredging along some 
quays;  work was completed in 1875 and this gave 100 feet in length of deepwater quay space 
with further work leading to 1,100 feet of wharfage. A Wingate dredger was built at Glasgow 
and one extra steam hopper was purchased in 1876 with another added the following year. 
The whole plant was regularly working by 1876 with the help of the ‘’Lee” and three of the 
older steam hoppers to carry out dredging to a depth of 14 feet and a width of 250 feet from 
Horse Head to Cork. By 1880 14 feet cut was complete up to Dundanion and by 1884 the cut 
was completed from Horse Head to the city; the NorthDeepwaterQuay (NDWQ) had now a 
length of 1,400 feet with 20 feet l.w.o.s.t and the SouthDeepwaterQuay (SDWQ) had 600 feet 
in length and 23 feet l.w.o.s.t. Around 1896 it was decided to make the channel 16 feet deep 
from Horse Head to Cork with a width of 350 feet. Fleming & Ferguson of Paisley were 
awarded a contract which consisted of the “Loughmahon” dredger and two twin screw 
 
82 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, Sept. 8th 1870.  
83 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, Sept. 27th 1870. 
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hopper barges of 1,200 tons carrying the most modern capacity in Ireland. The plant was 
delivered in 1896 and work was finished in 1904.84 
Following World War 1, Cork Harbour Commissioners had suffered significant financial losses 
and asked M.V. Conlon to look at all aspects of the business. Conlon found that dredging was 
the largest expense for the harbour authority and that there could be “...a lot of 
efficiencies...”. As regards dredging, he was very critical in respect of dredging operations and 
the significant costs that followed such an operation. He specifically pointed out that the cost 
of dredging could “swamp the Revenue of the Board “and that greater supervision was 
required. Such criticism could also be applied to previous decades of CHC dredging 
expenditure. Conlon found that figures regarding dredging loads were not reliable and 
“therefore calculations of the average cost of dredging per ton, based on such figures are 
worthless”. Figures were being returned by the captain with no method of verification and 
there was no person in charge to ensure tanks were empty before loading. The correct 
method, according to Conlon, was that each tank should be ½ full of water when loading 
began. These inefficiencies had probably been there for many years. 85 
 
12: Cork Harbour Commissioners: A legislative process  
 
In the mid 1840’s, the Tidal Harbours Commission report was to examine the United 
Kingdom’s major harbours with the intention of having all ports and harbours centralised. In 
September 1845, Captains, Washington, Frazer and Woulfe came to Cork to discuss proposals 
with the commissioners. The purpose was to centralise control of all UK ports in London. It 
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                                                                        40 
has been argued that the Tidal Report was strongly influenced by naval officers and engineers 
and it was to be from this group that the central staffs were to be recruited.86 The 
commissioners asked its River Committee to investigate. The committee were scathing in 
their analysis of the report and described the Captains’ as being ‘’wholly unfit’’ to undertake 
the management of the port. Likewise, major ports in Ireland and the U.K objected. The 
proposals were eventually dropped. 
In 1847 there was a general consolidating act passed into law, namely, The 1847 
Commissioners Clauses Act and the same year saw the passing of the Harbours Docks and 
Piers Clauses Act of 1847 which widened the powers of harbour boards and allowed them to 
take possession of land for construction of quays and wharves etc.  
However, not all legislation was as easy to process, as evidenced by the Cork Docks and 
Harbour Improvement Bill. There were significant objections to the proposals in that private 
enterprise should be to the forefront of such expenditure and that particularly, the 
commissioners would have to increase their dues if they underwent the project, with private 
enterprise paying higher rates. The shipyard Brown’s of Passage was one of the main 
objectors. Brown’s had invested in a new Graving Dock and cost in the region of £10,000 
which was to ensure the safe discharge and lighterage of cargo. The argument was that 
Passage people should not have to pay the levies imposed on Cork shipping. Also, the railway 
arriving meant that transhipment of goods between Passage and Cork was cheaper and safer 
now.87 
 
86 McCarthy (1949) and Pettit (1996), both make the point that naval personnel and engineers were 
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Opposition to the bill came from local ship owners who argued that there was little point in 
constructing costly accommodation for ships, if the ships in the first place, could not get 
upriver. There developed over the decades a widening gap between the concerns of the lower 
and upper harbour. The Cork Docks and Harbour Improvements Bill was never passed but it 
resurrected itself in legislation passed in 1875, 1877 and 1881 which was significant from a 
port viewpoint, in that, it involved the erection of new bridges, construction of the Deepwater 
Quay and the North Bank. 
The port was in serious disrepair with major quays built on the strand and foundations were 
too shallow to allow any further deep dredging. There were no lighthouses or buoys to mark 
the best areas of the channel when vessels of a certain size could only get to Cork and even 
then, it was dependant on tides. Finance or the lack of it, was another issue that faced the 
commissioners particularly as it was needed to carry out the necessary construction and 
dredging plans they were committed to. 
Cork Harbour Commissioners felt it was losing its place in maritime matters and preservation 
of trade and shipping was the essence of its remit and yet, the port had the lowest dues in 
the U.K. Many ports trebled and quadrupled their income in 18 to 20 years; nevertheless, 
Cork had only doubled its income in 50 years. Importantly, in the eyes of the commissioners, 
Cork had natural advantages which most ports did not have, and they felt they had a viable 
case for funding. 
Pettit outlines how the commissioners made two petitions for financial aid, to the 
Government in 1848. Both were refused and instead, the commissioners requested the 
enactment of a bill to allow them to borrow for construction work on the city quays. The 
proposals owed something to the reports of Nimmo and Killally. The building of a wet dock to 
the east of Penrose Quay was to cost £80,000 taking in 8 acres of water and was to be funded 
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through the Board of Public Works and from public subscription in the form of transferable 
bonds. Once the north docks were finished similar accommodation was to be built in the 
south channel at a cost of £120,000 taking in 6 acres. 88The Bill was never passed but elements 
appeared in legislation some 25 years later. 
The commissioners felt that the real requirement was to have foreign vessels particularly the 
Austrian ships from the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Gulf of Venice and the Danube 
ports capable of being able to come upriver to Cork city. In 1849, 67 such ships with cargoes 
of wheat and Indian corn had to unload at Passage. Not surprisingly, there was evidence of 
ships damaged in Cork and reports of American captains not willing to discharge at Passage 
which was 6 miles from their eventual destination.89 
It was not until after 1850 that a steady improvement took place in the river port. The river 
was dredged, the berths at Cork were deepened, the quays extended, and improved, and 
lighted buoys provided in the channel and by 1859 there were 12 miles of lighting in the 
estuary. By 1875 a thousand feet of deepwater berthage had been provided at Cork. 
 In terms of future development, the 1850’s saw a debate develop about dues on American 
vessels using the port and harbour. In 1849 to increase the eligibility of Cork as a transatlantic 
packet station, the commissioners decided there would be an exemption from tonnage dues 
on steam vessels departing and arriving from the American continent. It was inevitable that 
pressure would come from other port users and it did. It was agreed that Austrian, Prussian, 
Swedish and Norwegian vessels would pay similar pilotage rates as those available to British, 
American and French ships.90 
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The battle for packet mail service began. By 1858, the Australasian and Pacific Company 
received remittance of port dues for five years. Atlantic Royal Steamers got remission of 
twelve months in respect of their steamers sent to Cork for repairs and importantly, in 1859 
Queenstown became a port of call for Royal Mail steamers. 
Another piece of significant legislation was passed in 1866-the Cork Harbour Amendment Act 
1866- which allowed the commissioners to levy harbour dues on all vessels entering Cork port 
and not just those reporting to the Custom House. Of course, this meant an increase in 
revenue for the harbour authority. As well, the 1866 Act allowed the chairman of the 
Queenstown Town Commissioners to be an ex-officio member of the board. The total 
membership of the board now stood at 35 members. In 1868, the Cork Improvement Act was 
passed, and this allowed the commissioners to borrow based on a mortgage.91 The act 
significantly embodied an agreement between the Cork Harbour Commissioners and Cork 
Corporation where the commissioners were able to buy some land for disposal of dredging 
subject to the corporation getting permission to divert a portion of the railway line Cork, 
Blackrock and Passage West. The Board of Trade in 1864 granted the commissioners land and 
foreshore at Tivoli which turned out to be an important development in the long term. 
However, in the same year, the West Indies sugar trade ceased, once important to the port.  
In summary, whilst there was over a 100% increase in port income during the 20 year period 
1830-1849, and whatever increases there had been in trade and finance must be seen in the 
context of the poor condition of the port and yet, Cork was still the third most significant port 
in Ireland in terms of imports and exports. 
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13: Haulbowline and Dockyard 
 
There had been calls for the establishment of a dockyard in Haulbowline for quite some time. 
It is interesting that in June 1864 a deputation was met by Lord Palmerston, the Prime 
Minister; the deputation included prominent businessmen and the local M.P J. P. Maguire. 
The deputation made a strong case for Cork to have a dockyard and some of the arguments 
included:  
1: Cork was an excellent harbour with plenty of deepwater to accommodate large vessels. 
2: There was accessibility at all stages of the tide. 
3: The western location of Cork harbour had a strategic advantage attached. 
4: Ireland was not getting a fair share of the Admiralty vote. Argument was based on tax raised 
in Ireland as % of the UK as a whole and comparing the proportion of Admiralty vote spent in 
Ireland. Such an argument was based on local interests and did not consider the strategic 
arguments. The dockyard eventually opened in 1887.92 
In terms of the Royal Navy, Cork harbour never became a base for major units however they 
did call for fuel and provisions.93 City and lower harbour interests of the Cork Incorporated 
Chamber of Commerce and Shipping in 1888 urged the Admiralty to utilise Haulbowline as a 
repairing yard. Over £700,000 had been expended on the construction of the dock and basin 
but had been left derelict for many years. The then First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Spencer, 
eventually approved some minor work which included dredging and the repairing of a few 
gunboats. Some years later, in 1895, the local M.P. Captain Donelan, was still making 
 
92 Brunicardi, pp. 46-47 and 50. 
93 Dockyard was opened in 1887 but lacked necessary equipment to carry out major repairs to 
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representations as to how best to utilise the Dockyard.94 At the outbreak of World War 1, it 
was estimated that over 3,000 men were working at the dockyard.95 
 
14: Railways and other Utilities in the Nineteenth Century 
 
Many of the public institutions and public utilities essential to the infrastructure of Cork city 
date from the nineteenth century. The railways, which transformed Europe and America  
during the industrial revolution, arrived in Cork in the late 1840s and 1850s. The Cork, 
Blackrock and Passage Railway, the Cork South Coast and Bandon Railway and the Cork-Dublin 
line were all operational during the early years of that decade. Gas was initially used for public 
lighting in the city in 1826 with electricity first used in 1881 when a portable generator was 
used to power electric lights during the construction of Parnell Bridge. It was not used for 
public lighting until 1898 when it was supplied by the Cork Electric Tramways and Lighting 
Company Ltd. The trams of the same company provided public transport.96 
In 1834 the first rail link in Ireland between Dublin and Kingstown was established and two 
years later a provisional committee of the Cork Harbour Commissioners examined the 
possibility of a railway system linking the city port to Passage. The commissioners approved 
in principle and an agreement was signed on the 13th January 1847. In 1849 the first arrival 
of a train from Dublin to Cork took place and in the following year the Cork Blackrock and 
Passage railway line opened. The capital of the Cork Blackrock and Passage railway was 
£200,000 of which 6% was held by Quakers. The Cork to Passage line was opened in 1850 and 
 
94 Cork Incorporated Chamber of Commerce and Shipping, Commercial Handbook 1918, p. 32. 
95 Senator Alan Haughton, Parliamentary Debates Seanad Eireann, 28th November 1928, vol. 10, no. 
34. He stated that in Haulbowline, during the war there was ‘’…over 3,000 people employed there, 
expenditure in wages alone being over £150,000 a year”.  
96 http://www.corkcity.ie/aboutcork/historyofcork/19thcenturycork/ (Accessed January 2020). 
 
 
                                                                        46 
subsequently there followed competition between the railway company and the local river 
company in supplying a steamer service. The river company ceased to exist after 1890. Several 
harbour commissioners were involved in the development of railways and steamers in Cork. 
These included Thomas Sommerville Reeves and John McNamara who had bought shares in 
the local Citizens River Steamers Co. Sir John Arnott, a prominent commissioner, was also 
involved in the Citizens River Steamers Co.  
The Cork, Youghal and Cobh line was opened in 1862, Cork Bandon line in 1851, and 1872 the 
Cork Macroom line. By the end of the century, the port was a hub of a wide and busy network 
of railway transport with much of the activity centred on the quays with rail links facilitating 
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Chapter 2: Cork Harbour Commissioners-1870-1900: A period of progression 
 
1: Overview: Cork port in the early 1870’s 
 
In 1870 produce of the rich Munster farmlands which included butter, beef, eggs, wheat and 
oats were passing through the Port of Cork. Imports included an array of foodstuffs and raw 
materials such as coal, timber and clothing.97 Coal was to become an important financial 
earner for the port authority in the decades that followed. Exports in 1871 included butter, 
livestock, flour, porter, whiskey and pitwood. 
The period from 1870 to the end of the century was to witness a considerable amount of 
further development in the city quays which finally allowed larger ships to berth upriver  
and saw Cork improve and develop into a port and harbour with adequate facilities for the 
safe accommodation of vessels; this was in comparison to the period 1813 to 1850 when the 
port and harbour was inadequate to cater for even small vessels, many of which had to off-
load in Passage before coming upstream. This process came about as a result of a major 
programme of river dredging along with what Pettit describes as “…a consistent expansion of 
space for quay berthage”.98 The immediate priority for Cork Harbour Commissioners (CHC) 
was dredging of the port and harbour and a major start was made when the older part of the 
Navigation Wall was replaced in 1864 by the construction of Victoria Quay and it was also 
deemed necessary to deepen the river further by ‘’…driving timber sheet piling along the toes  
of the walls”.99 Using such a method between 1857 and 1864 a total of 18,580 feet of quays 
had been piled and with four dredgers at work, the channel from Passage to the city had also 
 
97 Lahiff, Edward, ‘Industry and labour in Cork: 1890-1921’ (unpublished M.A thesis,  
University College Cork, 1988), p. 48. 
98 Pettit (1996), pp. 23-7. 
99 Saunders (1956), p.122. 
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been deepened. The early 1870’s saw the end of trans-shipping cargoes at Passage even 
though in 1871 almost 400 ships had their cargoes discharged onto lighters in the river off 
Passage.100 
By the year 1872 foreign tonnage entering the port amounted to 143,381 tons and this was a 
7% increase over 1861. Dublin’s, foreign tonnage, in contrast,  amounted to 163,000 tons in 
1866.101 Cross channel traffic, in respect of Cork, was on the increase and had reached 
262,227 tons in 1872. Export of livestock in 1861 amounted to 124,953 animals which 
comprised of pigs, sheep, cows, calves and horses; this increased ten years later except for 
the export of horses. Butter firkins increased by less than 4% in the decade ended 1872; this 
was during the period 1867-76 which O’Donovan describes as the decade of greatest 
prosperity for the butter industry.102 The export of bacon had increased over a 20 year period 
from 12,822 bales in 1853 to 59,292 bales in 1871.  
Shipbuilding was an important industry to Cork port but had declined from the 1860’s and 
this was as a result of the demise of the port’s transatlantic business which led eventually to 
transhipments through the larger English ports. As a result, the industry was deprived of 
lucrative contracts.103 In that context, Solar points out that there was modest growth in Irish 
shipping till the mid-1820’s which was followed by faster growth with a “deceleration’’ in  
the late 1870’s through to World War 1.104 
 
 
100 O’Mahony, Colman, The Maritime Gateway to Cork (Cork, 1986), p. 54.  
101 Gilligan, Henry A., A History of The Port of Dublin (Dublin, 1988), p.131. 
102 O’Donovan, John, The economic history of livestock in Ireland (Cork, 1940), p. 315.  
103 Bielenberg, Andy, Cork’s Industrial Revolution: 1780-1880 (Cork, 1991), pp. 113 and 122. 
104 Solar, Peter M., ‘Shipping and economic development in nineteenth-century 
 Ireland’, Economic History Review, LIX, 4 (2006), pp. 719-37.  
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2: Capital Infrastructure, facilities and dredging 
 
The next period of the port’s history was to be hugely significant particularly from a legislative 
perspective and was to give the harbour authority important financial powers of 
independence. The first legislative piece of significance was passed in 1871 and this had the 
effect of repealing some seven sections of the 1820 Act; the 1820 Act had provided for the 
formalisation of CHC’s constitution and procedures. The Pier and Harbour Orders 
Confirmation Act 1871 (no. 2) was significant as previously the construction of any quay 
required the consent of the Board of Trade before work commenced and also, under this 
legislation, the commissioners were granted further borrowing powers of £110,000.105  
Cork Harbour Commissioners in 1872 felt that a plan was required for the future development 
of the port and city quays. The lighterage expenses from Passage to Cork combined with other 
losses and inconvenience to merchants influenced Cork Harbour Commissioners to embark 
on expensive deepwater quay construction and dredging for a channel to the Cork quays. This 
was because heavier vessels used to stop at Passage and transfer part of their cargoes into 
lighters for their onward journey to Cork. The significance of lighterage is illustrated as 
follows: in the year ended April 1872, 220 vessels discharged entirely at Passage with gross 
tonnage of 101,836 tons and 109 vessels lightened at Passage to about fourteen feet of water; 
the lightened vessels then came upriver to Cork and their gross tonnage amounted to 50,917 
tons.106 The cargoes which discharged at Passage were principally grain and timber. 
A report was commissioned from Bell and Millar, Glasgow Consulting Engineers, in 1872 in 
which they recommended the construction of deepwater quays at both sides of the river 
 
105 O’Riordan (2015), p. 307. 
106 Pettit (1986), p. 2. 
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below the Custom House, to be followed by the construction of docks at the City Park and 
most interesting, a similar dock system at the Tivoli slob lands. The importance of Tivoli had 
been realised at this stage.107 Bell and Millar also regarded as ‘’first importance’’ the proper 
connection of the railway system with the harbour.  
Philip Barry replaced Sir. John Benson in 1873, with the new title of harbour engineer and 
observed that there were no deeper berths for vessels than at the old quays with 7 feet at 
low water and he saw that there was an urgent necessity for vessels to have better shipping 
accommodation. Barry said it was 1874 before the first attempt was made to allow vessels 
from overseas to discharge afloat; this consisted of constructing several timber jetties along 
Victoria Quay and dredging to 20 feet depth at low water. The timber wharf cost £11,544 and 
was immediately used by grain vessels that had previously discharged their cargoes at Passage 
and then onto lighters. This work was completed in 1875 and gave 1,000 feet in length to 
deepwater berthage. Subsequently, these jetties were improved upon and extended  
to form the Victoria Wharf with 1,100 feet of berthage108 and in the same year, 18  
feet had been dredged which allowed larger vessels to come upriver. 
In 1875 an Act of Parliament was passed authorising a large extension of deepwater quays 
along the Marina. This act granted further powers for the improvement of the harbour, to 
construct a deepwater quay on the south side of the river and £20,000 was allowed for the 
development of the lower harbour. The act allowed the harbour authority to raise a sum of 
£140,000 in total. Under this act, Cork Harbour Commissioners were defined as a body 
 
107 Report for Cork Harbour Commissioners: R.D. Bell & D. Millar. “Report on the Harbour & 
dock accommodation and the General Improvements of the Port of Cork” (Glasgow, 1872), 
pp. 131-2. 
108 Barry, Philip, ‘The Deep Quays in the Port of Cork’, Minutes of the proceedings of the Institution 
of Civil Engineers of Ireland (January 1890), vol. 100, part 2, p. 316. 
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corporate under the name Cork Harbour Commissioners with perpetual succession and now 
had a common seal. 
 The Cork Improvement Act 1875 enabled Cork Corporation to replace the Sundays Well and 
the Anglesea bridges. CHC was to contribute £10,000 towards the removal of the Anglesea 
Bridge and construction of a new one, under the act CHC were given powers to raise a loan 
accordingly. The Cork improvement (Extension of Time) Act of 1881 granted further time for 
the completion of the Anglesea Bridge which was named subsequently Parnell Bridge. This 
act was repealed by the Harbours Act 1946.  
In 1876, Cork Harbour Commissioners, ever watchful of the public interest, opposed a Bill 
promoted in parliament by the Great Southern & Western Railway for the purchase of land, 
formerly known as Dring’s Marsh, and compelled the railway company to convey free of  
charge, a frontage of 40 feet for a new deepwater quay from Penrose Quay to Water Street 
and the company were also bound to convey to Cork Corporation 40 feet of ground for a new 
roadway north of the new quay. 
Two years later under the Cork Harbour Act of 1877, Cork Harbour Commissioners, were able 
to construct a deepwater quay on the north bank of the river for 1,421 feet from Penrose 
Quay to Water Street with construction commencing in 1878. The act also allowed for the 
construction of a Boat Harbour in Queenstown and the purposes of the act allowed CHC to 
raise a sum of £120,000. This act was repealed by the 1946 Harbours Act.109 
Developments continued with the completion in 1883 of the Deepwaterquay (DWQ) at 
Queenstown which provided a depth of 24 feet for a length of 600 feet (low water spring 
 
109 The Cork Harbour Act of 1875 was repealed under the Harbours Act,1946, Schedule 3, 
 Section 190. Other acts repealed included the Cork Harbour Amendment Act 1866, 
 Cork Harbour Order 1871, Cork Harbour Act 1877, Cork Improvement (Extension of Time) 
 Act 1881, Cork Harbour Act 1883, Cork Harbour Order 1889, and Cork Harbour Act 1903. 
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tides). This quay was used almost exclusively by government ships and transports and during 
the second Boer war, 143 means of transport berthed at Queenstown and trains with troops 
and war materials were able to run alongside the ships. It was 1899 that saw the invasion of 
the Transvaal with many troops embarking for the war from Queenstown. 
Saunders observed that by 1884 the ‘New Wall ‘ had been virtually replaced and that all of 
the old rubble walls, of which Nimmo had complained about in the early years of the century, 
had been replaced by cut-stone walls.110 It could be argued that the old rubble of the quays 
was partly to blame for the cost of dredging and McCarthy points out that between 1877 and 
1883 an average of 570,000 tons was dredged.111 A general trade depression had now set in 
with the effect that it would be another 10 years before any major capital work would be 
carried out. In 1884 the North Deepwater Quay with 20 feet depth (low water spring tides), 
and a length of 1,400 feet was completed stretching along the river from Water Street to the 
westward end of Penrose Quay;112 also, the South Deepwater Quay was completed with 23 
feet depth (low water spring tides), for a length of over 600 feet, and both quays were opened 
for traffic. A year later in 1885, Penrose Wharf was completed. 
The revival of trade in 1894 made it possible to consider additional port improvement, more 
particularly to facilitate the cross-channel trade. Early that year a contract was entered into 
to construct 1,260 feet of timber wharves along St. Patrick’s and Penrose Quays, with 13 feet 
of water (low water spring tides), to accommodate cross channel steamers and allow them to 
sail and berth at any time, except for about three hours at low water. 
 
110 Saunders, F. O’C, ‘The Development of the River Port of Cork City’, The Institution of Civil 
 Engineers of Ireland (March 1956), vol. 82, p. 126.; See Nimmo, Alexander, Report to the 
 Harbour Commissioners on the Means of Improving the River and Harbour of Cork 
 (Cork, 1815). 
111 McCarthy, Patrick J, ‘An Economic History of the Port of Cork: 1813-1900’ (unpublished 
 M. EconSc. thesis, University College Cork, 1949), p. 79 
112 McCarthy (1949), p. 86. 
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In the space of 30 years, the total amount of dredged material amounted to 14 million tons 
and this was done by investment, borrowing and purchase of equipment. Cost per ton in 1875 
was 9.5 pence and in 1900 was 2.5 pence. Conlon in his report was very critical of CHC 
dredging operations and regarded the method of calculating the cost per ton as being 
unreliable.113 Nearly three and a half million tons of material was dredged to deepen the 
channel. By 1899 dredging methods had advanced to such an extent that for berth cleaning 
work, a grab and crane were fitted on two hoppers with the dredger ‘’Loughmahon’’ used for 
channel dredging only.114 The cost of dredging was examined each year and in the latter half 
of the century, a certain amount of dredging was charged to capital with the balance charged 
to expenditure. It could be argued that it was convenient to charge a certain portion of the 
cost to capital thereby reducing the cost charged to maintenance.115 The War Office wanted 
to lay cables in the harbour in 1888, Cork Harbour Commissioners objected as the cables could 
be a danger to shipping and possibly disrupt dredging operations. In the end, the War Office 
accepted responsibility for damage to shipping by cables only and in, 1900 CHC had signed an 
agreement regarding the laying of cables for wartime mining operations in the lower harbour 
channel.116 Upriver, the future development of Tivoli took a step forward in 1901 when CHC 
was given a grant by the Board of Trade of almost 3 acres of land and foreshore which 
extended their portfolio of property. Another 3 acres were acquired in 1902 and further land 
 
113 Report for Cork Harbour Commissioners. “Report on the Organisation and Management of 
 the Several Departments”. Presented by Michael V. Conlon (Cork, 1922), p. 20. 
114 Pettit (1996), p. 148. 
115 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of Law and Finance Committee, May 24th, 1901. 
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was given to Cork Harbour Commissioners in 1919 which was some fifty years after the initial 
grant of land. Such developments were financed by raising mortgages on CHC property.117 
 
3: Cork Harbour Commissioners: Port Finances 1870-1900 
 
There are various methods used in measuring the growth of a port, namely, tonnage using 
the port, imports and exports, relative share of trades, capital expenditure, key performance 
indicators (KPI’s) and financial accounts.118 Financial accounts, along with trade figures, were 
examined from the 1870’s to 1900 and the accounting year during this period ended on the 
31st July.  
 
3.1: Cork Harbour Commissioners Revenues 
 
In the case of the Port of Cork, tonnage, imports and exports were the principal income 
commodities which amounted to over 65% of total income with ballast and anchorage dues, 
in the main, making up the balance. Ballast dues were 11% of total income in 1885 but 
declined to 3% by 1900.  
Between 1860 and 1900 import revenue increased by almost 74%, with exports increasing by 
38% and tonnage income increased by 194%. (See Table 4. 1). The increase in tonnage income 
averaged 5% per annum with imports and exports less than 2% and 1% per annum 
 
117 The special Cork Harbour Commissioners board meeting of 20th November 1916 dealt 
with a proposal from Henry Ford & Son to set up a factory for “Motor Traction and 
Agricultural machinery”. The setting up of the Ford operation was a significant revenue 
earner for the port. 
118 Hyde, Francis. Liverpool and the Mersey, (Newton Abbott, 1971), p. xv. 
 Hyde outlines the various methods used in measuring the growth of a port and used Liverpool 
 as an example. 
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respectively. The period 1880-1885 showed a huge increase in tonnage income and this was 
primarily because of the increase in rates.  
It is worth noting that from 1867 harbour dues were payable under legislation passed that 
year on all vessels entering the port and not, as heretofore, only on vessels reporting at the 
Custom House. This meant a major increase in revenue.119 As well, prior to the mid-1890’s 
quantities of different types were the form of measurement used with tons subsequently 
becoming the norm. Butter and firkins would be an example. Analysis of import and export 
products was only possible on an individual basis and to get a real comparison in the review 
period monetary values were used. 
In the latter half of the century, there were three main shipping companies operating in the 
Port of Cork and these were: The City of Cork Steam Packet Company, Clyde Shipping 
Company and Cork Steam Ship Company. Significantly, the companies also had 
representatives on the board of CHC and they would take part in discussions relating to  
business that concerned them.120 An example would be that in April and May 1893 there were 
discussions regarding the reduction of rates by 10% and various representatives of the 
companies involved were present at the meetings. The end proposal agreed by the board 
followed agreement with the companies involved.  
Tonnages measure the capacity of ships however vessels ‘’in ballast’’ were not recorded or  
 
119 McCarthy (1949), p. 85. 
120 Cork City and County Archives, City of Cork Steam Packet Co Ltd, U370/A/001. 
 The City of Cork Steam Packet Company, Clyde Shipping Company and Cork Steam Ship Company, 
 had most of the shipping business in the Port of Cork. The City of Cork Steam Packet Co. Ltd. 
 was the largest of the companies involved and its directors included names like Pike, 
 Lyons, McNamara, and Green. Many of whom were members of CHC. Directors were to be 
 paid the sum of £1,000 per annum. In the accounts for 1878, the Book Value of Tonnage 
 is shown as £180,000 and the chairman pointed out with such a valuation, they would fail to 
 realise value if placed on the market. The Tonnage valuation (steamships etc) amounted to 
 over 60% of assets. 
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maybe, even kept separate in various port’s shipping statistics. Over time what was described 
as ballast changed and by 1872 cargoes such as china, clay, bricks and iron ore were counted 
as ballast. The values of these commodities were insignificant in Irish terms.121 
In some years ballast income was shown in the CHC accounts as gross income with ballast 
expenditure being shown under expenditure and similarly net profit would be shown under 
income.  
 
3.2: Control by shipping companies 
 
 In the latter part of the century, shipping was largely controlled by the City of Cork Shipping 
Company and Clyde Shipping amongst others. The City of Cork was estimated to have had 
31% of CHC business. The control that the City of Cork had over CHC is illustrated by the 
following: CHC, by law, were entitled to a copy of a ship’s manifest or the bill of lading. The 
tonnage rate or levy could be ascertained this way. What happened was that a clerk from CHC 
would go to the City of Cork offices and have the manifests read to him. This cost CHC £40 
p.a. In October 1895 there was a vacancy to specifically carry out the duties of helping the 
City of Cork Company. The CHC board recommended “… £40 to be paid to City of Cork in 
consideration of their affording the Collector all necessary assistance whilst employed at their 
office, on the business of the board it being understood that the company will make such 
arrangements as to prevent their clerk from being unnecessarily interrupted during the time 
so occupied”.122  
 
 
121 Solar, Peter M., ‘Shipping and economic development in nineteenth-century Ireland’ 
 Economic History Review, LIX, 4 (2006), p. 719. 
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3.3: Tonnages: Port of Cork 1873-1901 
 
Total tonnage in 1873 amounted to 678,234 and by 1901 had reduced to 606,392. Total 
tonnages for the 1873-1901 period amounted to 19,592,717 and the breakdown is shown in 
the table.     
                       
Table 2. 1 Cork Port - Ship Tonnages 1873-1901 
Type Tonnage  % 




Colliers 4,722,894 24 
Coasters Ireland. 813,313 4 
      
Total 19,592,717 100 
Source: CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, annual accounts  
and port statistics of Cork Harbour Commissioners, 1873-1901.  
           
The cross-channel coasters, with the highest number of tonnages, are reflective of the trade 
connections with Britain. For each of the years under review, the cross-channel coasters had 
the highest tonnage in and out of the port. In percentage terms, it amounts to over 51%. 
Colliers had a significant tonnage throughput during the period and were ahead of foreign 
tonnage. Colliers peaked in 1883 with a tonnage of 204,950. 
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The 7-year period ended 1879 saw total tonnage averaging 699,000 and this average declined 
in the 10-year period ended 1889 to 682,000; dropped further to 664,000 for the period 
ended 1899 and declined further to 656,000 for the 12-year period ended 1901. 
The decline is primarily down to foreign tonnage declining from 173,360 in 1873 to 89,884 in 
1888.123 
Tonnage income in 1870 amounted to 25% of total income and had increased to 40% by 1900. 
In 1873 foreign tonnage amounted to 29.5% of total tonnage income, cross-channel income 
amounted to 48.9% with collier’s tonnage income amounting to 21%. Comparing tonnages 
against income, the main difference is that tonnage income is higher in percentage terms than 
the actual tonnage throughput which reflects the method of charging foreign vessels. In 1883 
there was a slight change where the foreign tonnage percentage dropped by 7% with the 
cross-channel colliers increasing by a similar amount. 
The major change took place in 1884 when foreign tonnage increased dramatically. In 1883 
the percentage was 26%, increased to almost 38% in 1884 and this came about due to a very 
large increase in foreign tonnage rates. In 1883 foreign tonnage per ton was 3d and this 
increased to 1/- which is a 300% increase whilst the cross-channel rate increased from 3d to 
4d per ton or 33.33%. In 1894, in respect of foreign tonnage, a new rate of 6d was introduced, 
in addition to the rate of 1/-. The lower rate amounted to 6% of foreign tonnage income and 
gradually increased to 17% in 1901 with colliers and coasters (Irish) also having significant 





123 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, the detail was adapted from the annual accounts and 
port statistics of 1873-1901. 
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3.4: Maritime Shipping Legislation 
 
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 was a major piece of legislation and dealt with rules 
regarding ship register tonnage. The act gave the British Board of Trade the right to administer 
shipping throughout the British Empire, limiting the power of a Dominion to alter the act and 
requiring the King’s permission before changes were made. When the Free State came into 
being it was unable to legislate in this area, and whilst the tricolour was flown on Irish ships, 
it was not legally recognised. The Attorney General at the Imperial Conference in 1926 argued 
that each member should be given the right to control every class of shipping within their 
jurisdiction.124 The Merchant Shipping Act allowed for considerable deduction from the 
registered tonnage of steam vessels in respect of space occupied by propelled machinery. 
The transition from sail to steam, larger vessels being used and the improvement in port 
facilities must be borne in mind when examining tonnage factors. Sailing vessels were 
recorded as gross tonnage, which was very similar to net tonnage, as regards steam vessels 
registered tonnage was the tonnage net of the engine room.125  
Starkey in his analysis of coastal traffic 126 showed how Cork was slow to change from sail to 





124 McCullagh, David, The reluctant Taoiseach: John A. Costello, (Dublin, 2011), pp. 77-87. 
125 Vasudevan, Aji, ‘Tonnage measurement of ships: historical evolution, current issues and 
 proposals for the way forward’ (unpublished thesis, M.Sc., in Maritime Affairs, World 
 Maritime University, Malmo, 2010). The thesis gives a detailed account of historical net and 
 gross tonnages. 
126 Starkey, David J., Gorski, Richard, Milward, Sue, Pawlyn, Tony, (Editors). Shipping Movements 
in the Ports of the United Kingdom, 1871-1913:  A Statistical Profile (Exeter, 1999). 
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Table 2. 2 Irish Coastal Traffic -Sail and Steam:1876-1901 
Coastal 
Traffic: 
 Cork    Ireland   
   Tonnage  Tonnage  Tonnage  Tonnage 
Year Sail Steam Sail Steam 
1876 66% 34% 57% 43% 
1881 60% 40% 48% 52% 
1886 49% 51% 38% 62% 
1891 44% 56% 31% 69% 
1896 36% 64% 22% 78% 
1901 35% 65% 18% 82% 
 
Source: The table was adapted from Starkey, David J., Gorski, Richard, Milward, Sue, Pawlyn, Tony, 




3.5: Import and export revenue 
 
Revenue from imports in 1869 amounted to 41% of total income and remained at that level 
for the next 2 years. However, from 1872, imports income had declined to 36% in 1891. 
Subsequently, imports as a percentage of total income then increased almost on a yearly basis 
so that by 1900 it had reached 40%. With income of £10,009, 1874 was the lowest year in 
respect of imports income during the period of review and this is reflected in Table 2.3 which 
shows the income for the five years ended 1875 as the lowest in the 20 years ended 1900. 
Yet the years 1891-1895 shows a return of 25% which is the highest for the period. In the 
overall context imports income for the period 1871-1900 amounted to £399,816 which only 
gave an average return of 1.6% per annum.  
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The main concentration and analysis will be on the following products as they amounted to 
over 50% of total imports revenue: wheat, Indian corn, flour and coal. (See Appendix 2.1). 
In summary, wheat and Indian corn declined over the 25-year analysis and coal was the 
biggest earner for the period albeit from a low base. 
 








 £  %  
1871-1875 55,776    
1876-1880 65,734  18  
1881-1885 61,727  -6  
1886-1890 62,154  1  
1891-1895 77,640  25  
1896-1900 76,785  -1  
Total 399,816    
Source: CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, the detail was  
adapted from the annual accounts and port statistics of Cork Harbour  
Commissioners, 1871-1901.  
 
The main commodities imported in the period were the following: wheat, Indian corn/maize, 
coal, flour, timber deals, sugar, tea, salt, iron and steel and oil.  
The period 1878/1879 was the best year for wheat imports and the year 1901 was the lowest. 
When we look at Indian corn there is no correlation with wheat imports as the best year was 
1876/1877 and 1883/1884 the worst. Coal had its best year in 1883/1884. 
Wheat, Indian corn, barley all had a similar rate per ton with coal having one of the lowest 
rates of import. It is interesting to note that the Cork Harbour Commissioners wrote to Belfast 
Harbour Commissioners pointing out that imports of coal from South Wales would be cheaper  
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to import into Cork and then, deliver to Belfast rather than importing from the north of 
England and that also, wages would be cheaper. Needless to mention the suggestion failed.127 
The Coal tax was abolished in 1878 with the final payment of £3,150 made to Cork 
Corporation by the commissioners. This tax was often referred to as the “Mayor’s Tax” and 
was a tax imposed on coal imports through the port. The passing of the Parliamentary Coal 
Act in 1719 allowed proceeds of a coal tax to be used to build a church as in the case of 
Christchurch, which was the civic church of Cork city. This act levied a tax of one shilling on 
every ton of coal Imported into the city for seven years.128 Caulfield points out that another 
purpose of the coal tax was contributing towards the building of a workhouse and ‘’.... your 
coal tax will revert to you for the annual support and maintenance of the poor and the 
foundlings ...’’.129 The average yield of this tax from 1719 to 1726 was about £256.130  
Exports were analysed over the 25 year period 1877 to 1901. The commodities examined 
included the broad area of livestock which comprised pigs, sheep, cows, calves and horses. 
Agricultural commodities included butter, oats and flour. 
Revenue from exports in 1869 amounted to 16% and remained at that level for the next 2 
years. However, from 1872 till 1892 exports income remained static ranging from 13% at its 
highest to 11% at its lowest in 1892. Subsequently, exports as a percentage of total income 
declined marginally and by 1900 had reached 10%.  
The year 1898 recorded the lowest level of income during the review period and the years 
1894 and 1895 reported the highest return with income of £5,606 and £5,333 respectively.  
 
127 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, 15th September 1899. 
128 https://triskelartscentre.ie/christchurch/christchurch-history/18th-century-rebuild/ 
129 Caulfield, Richard, The Council Book of the Corporation of the City of Cork from 1609 to 1643 
and from 1690 to 1800 (Surrey, 1876), pp. 550-1. 
130 O’Sullivan, W, The Economic History of Cork city from the earliest times to the Act of Union (Cork, 
1937), p. 220. 
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The decline of provisions and the rise of protectionism in other markets increased 
competition in the British market which remained open. The decline of the provisions trade 
was inevitable because some countries became self-sufficient through tariffs and developed 
their own export markets and there seemed to be a slow reaction in Cork trying to stem the 
tide. On a more positive note, Cork’s agricultural hinterland was seen to be a significant factor 
in helping the port’s trade. Cognisance must also be taken of how ships could come directly 
to the upper harbour by 1900 unlike the situation earlier in the century when goods/cargo 
had to be off-loaded at Passage on to lighters for the onward journey to the city quays. This 
made handling cargoes more efficient and cost effective. Commodities such as flour, bacon, 
oats, porter, timber, hides, glass, tanning, sugar and bran may be of significance in terms of 




In the space of two hundred years, Cork had emerged as one of the leading exporters in the 
world of dairy produce primarily as the climate was ideal for pastoral agriculture. The 
provision trade and in particular, salted meat and butter, gained as a result and that was 
allowing for restrictions which were imposed on exports of live cattle. By the 1870's Cork still 
had 30% of the Irish butter market with the butter trade a major source of employment and 
contributed much to the prosperity of Cork. Over the 19th century, the butter trade declined 
as a result of heavy duties on imports imposed by the Portuguese government and this had a 
major effect on what was one of Cork’s major markets. The markets in the Americas were 
also affected and declined accordingly. A poor-quality control system along with the market 
entry of butter substitutes had a further effect on the export market, as well, the butter 
merchants failed to respond to changes in the industry. So, the inability to react to changes 
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in the industry and the lack of innovation meant Cork lost its dominant position in the 
market.131 Nevertheless, butter exports were one of the major revenue earners for the 
harbour authority during the period of review. In the period 1870-74, the five-year average 
of firkins exported was 2,057,096, subsequently declined to 1,757,109 in the period 1880-84 
and further in 1890-94 to 1,507,394. Between 1870 and 1894 there was a decline of over 26% 
in the export of firkins.  
 
3.7: Assets and Liabilities 
 
Total assets of Cork Harbour Commissioners were valued at £32,000 in 1868, £40,000 in 1869 
and £49,000 in 1870. By 1872 plant was valued at £44,000 and by 1876 £66,000. 
A Sinking Fund was set up in 1878 which saw the commissioners invest in consols and a 
Reserve and Contingencies fund was also set up. A principal aim of the sinking fund was to 
fund deepwater costs. The 1885 accounts show the commissioners investing in Irish railway 
debenture stock in respect of the Reserve and Contingencies fund. By 1900 total assets were 
valued at £337,000 and comprised mainly of Estate £205,000 and Investments valued at 
£66,000. 
With the significant expenditure works undertaken by the Cork Harbour Commissioners, 
particularly regarding repair and creation of quays and coupled with the extensive dredging 
programme it was obvious that borrowings had to be undertaken. The first account of 
mortgages begins in 1872/1873 with the amount of £40,000 appearing in the financial 
accounts. By 1874/1875 mortgage debt amounted to £70,000. At the end of the ten-year 
period 1883/1884, debt had increased by £239,000 to reach a level of £278,685 which was 
 
131 Rynne, Colin, 1998, At the sign of the cow: The Cork Butter Market, 1770-1924 (Cork, 1998), p. 34. 
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the highest level of debt incurred. The level of debt by 1900/1901 was £276,308. The amounts 
mentioned are in most cases net amounts-difference between additional mortgage and 
repayment.132 In terms of liabilities in 1900 Consolidated Stock is the primary item and was 
valued at £278,000. Interestingly in the list of creditors names such as Robinson and Scott 
appear, and they were also members of the board. Likewise, the City of Cork Steam Packet 
Company appeared as a creditor and some of their directors were members of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners. Other members of the board who were shown as creditors included the 
Deaves Bros and members of the Sutton family. 
The board were able to borrow for harbour developments once the necessary legislation was 
passed, for example, under The Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation Act 1871 (no.2), 
amounts were borrowed at 4.5%.133 Expenditure included the purchase of land at 
Carrigreenan and work on the DWQ’s, in Cork and Queenstown, leading to additional 
mortgage of £34,900 in 1882. The year 1884 saw payments made to the Cork Corporation in 
respect of Parnell Bridge. Included in income received was £20,000, from the Marquis of Bute 
regarding the sale of no. 3 dredger and no. 5 and 6 hopper barges. The 1889 accounts show 
£153,798-13-4 of mortgage debt converted into 4% stock which effected a permanent saving 
of interest. 134 
Cork Harbour Commissioners, with the purpose of raising equity, would issue stock holdings 
from time to time. Primarily this would be 4% redeemable or irredeemable stock. Most of the 
stockholders were individuals, shopkeepers, clergymen and others. The more significant 
 
132 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, annual accounts: 1870-1901. 
133 The Pier and Harbour Orders Confirmation Act 1871 (no. 2);  O’Riordan (2015), pp. 307-8. 
134 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, annual accounts 1882. 
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holdings were held primarily by business owners and company directors. There were many 
interesting purchasers of the 4% stock, and these would have included: 
The Munster and Leinster Bank £4,700, Provincial Bank of Ireland £5,600 and commissioners 
such as Pike and McMullen who had stockholdings of £7,400 each. 
The twentieth century saw Cork Harbour Commissioners investing in different shares 
including Great Southern Railway stock and interestingly, some commissioners would have 
had a shareholding in the Great Southern and Western Railway. The investment in railway 
shares yielded relatively good returns, but holdings of such shares were also useful in  
providing access and influence in railway company shareholder meetings. 
 
3.8 Cork Harbour Commissioners and The Munster Bank 135 
 
Historically, in terms of banking, the Munster Bank was the commissioner’s bank, which was 
established in 1864 and collapsed into voluntary liquidation in July 1885. William Shaw M.P 
was chairperson of Munster Bank and the directors included Nicholas D. Murphy, Joseph 
McMullen, Francis Lyons, William Lumley Perrier, James H. Belton and Edmund G. Dease. At 
the time of its closing, the bank had 41 branches including a head office at 66, South Mall, 
Cork and two branches in Dublin. The appointed liquidators were Robert Constable Hall, 
James Jeremiah Murphy and Frederick William Pim, and their solicitors were D & J Fitzgerald. 
The Munster and Leinster Bank was established subsequently in September 1885 and it took 
over the remaining assets and liabilities of the Munster Bank in November 1886.  
 
135 Cork City and County Archives, Munster Bank Liquidation Records, IE CCCA/B617. 
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Some of the directors of Munster Bank were very involved in the running of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners, William Shaw, chairman of the bank, was elected as a commissioner, under 
the mercantile banner, from 1887 to 1890 and was also director of the Cork  Macroom railway 
and director of the South of Ireland Fishing Co. Ltd. Nicholas D. Murphy was director of City 
of Cork Steam Packet Co. Ltd. and as an M.P, he was an ex-officio member of the 
commissioners from February 1865 to April 1880 and was elected under the mercantile 
banner from August 1880 to December 1885.  
In terms of shipping, Joseph McMullen, was involved with the St. George Steam Packet 
Company and Francis Lyons, was a director of both, Cork Steamship Company Ltd and City of 
Cork Steam Packet Company. They both were members of Cork Harbour Commissioners. 
Likewise, some of the liquidators played a major role in the running of the commissioners. 
Robert Constable Hall was director of Hall’s grain merchants and was elected a commissioner, 
as the mercantile representative, serving from 1881 to 1888. James Jeremiah Murphy was a 
mercantile representative on the board of the commissioners from 1860 to 1884 and 1893 to 
1900. 
Many firms, individuals and public bodies were affected by the closure of the bank and 
subsequent liquidation and these included Cork Harbour Commissioners. The liquidators of 
the bank were shown as debtors of the harbour authority at the suspension of the bank and 
this included £4,000 on a deposit account, £1,277-0-9 on current account less £17-3-6 on 
dredging account leaving a net figure of £5,259-17-3. The Cork Harbour Commissioners 
accounts show how various payments were made to CHC from the liquidators. According to 
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4: Cork and National Ports Trade 
 
The returns of local taxation included income returns by all harbours and a comparison was 
able to be used in seeing how ports/harbours performed during the period of analysis. Using 
these returns I have been able to compile a picture of revenue receipts of ports/harbours 
covering the period 1875 to 1900. The analysis covered 93% of income received by harbour 
authorities, small harbours with insignificant income were excluded. The returns included all 
income receipts by the authorities but for this exercise, it is just tonnage, imports and exports 
revenue that are included. Some harbours would have had the added benefit of income such 
as lighthouse charges, but this did not apply to all harbours. 136 Belfast, in terms of income, 
was well ahead of other harbours and was the only harbour that shows an increase in income 
during each 5-year period. Interestingly, Londonderry was ranked as the fourth harbour on 
the island during the 25-year review. (See Table 4. 3 p.116 ). 
 
5: Constraints on Investment 
 
Railway companies and CHC-an uneasy relationship: CHC from time to time were objectors to 
railway developments in the port and never more so than in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century. For example, in June of 1896, there was an objection to the Cork Blackrock and 
Passage Railway Bill by means of a petition to the House of Lords. The same year also saw the 
major shipping companies objecting to bridges being built across the north and south 
 
136 http://www.dippam.ac.uk/eppi/documents/ (DIPPAM: Documenting Ireland: Parliament, People 
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channels under the Cork Junction Tramways Scheme.137 However, the main area of 
disagreement that CHC had was with the Great Southern and Western Railway. (GSW). CHC 
were seen to be major objectors to the 1898 Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours 
bill legislation proposed by GSW.138 Section 74 provided that GSW companies should give all 
reasonable facilities to induce traffic to pass to and from and via Cork and that by their rates 
or fares or otherwise the Port of Cork was not to be at an undue disadvantage as compared 
with any other Irish port.139 CHC had in the past complained that the Port of Cork was at an 
undue disadvantage as compared with other Irish ports particularly as there were insufficient 
wagons to cope with coal traffic through the port.  As well, CHC maintained that the railway 
company had in the past afforded facilities to traffic to and from the port of Rosslare which 
CHC claimed had been denied to the port of Cork.140 Through rates applied to the carriage of 
commodity from an Irish port to a U.K. port through any of the routes by which the differential 
rate applied. A differential rate was set up in 1881 in the case of Cork and applied to Limerick, 
Waterford, Galway, Sligo and Wexford and these differentials were agreed by the members 
of the traffic conference representing the various railway companies. Interestingly, by 1931 
GSW had applied to the railway tribunal for the differential in respect of Cork to be rescinded. 
The Ports and Harbours Tribunal in their report was critical of the GSW policy to have traffic 
through Dublin or Rosslare, “…if this policy is allowed free course it will be a matter of time  
 
137 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, Cork Junction Railways Bill, HC Deb 20 February 1905 
vol 141 cc566-7. 
138 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours Bill, HC Deb 03 
May 1898 vol 57 cc128F-54. 
139 Tribunal of Inquiry on Public Transport, (Dublin, 1939), Evidence of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners, pp. 1-5. It is worth noting Rosslare Port to-day, is owned by Coras 
Iompair Eireann. 
140 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, Fishguard and Rosslare Railways and Harbours Bill, 
 HC Deb 03 May 1898 vol 57 cc128F-54. CHC had engaged counsel at a rate of 10 guineas 
 each, which was expensive at the time. 
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before the south and western ports decline”.141 
 
6: Cork Corporation and CHC -a stressful relationship 
 
The relationship between the Corporation and the Commissioners could be stressful at times 
and this was highlighted in 1927, at the Ports and Harbours Tribunal; when James Price, 
Harbour Engineer, in giving evidence, in relation to the Cork Improvement Act 1880, stated 
“they slipped in a clause that the Harbour Board should maintain the opening part of the 
bridge which the Corporation had always done previously. This escaped the notice of the 
Harbour Board… The bridge is a dead loss’’. The purpose of the act was to grant further time 
for the building of the Anglesea Bridge. Regarding the act, Mr Price pointed out that an 
engineer and boy labourer were required to operate the bridge, and this required their full-
time attention.142 Maybe in retrospect, the commissioners should have been more diligent in 
their approach to the legislation. Philip Barry, the then harbour engineer, told the board of 
Cork Harbour Commissioners that the ‘’turntable‘’ of Anglesea Bridge was not being 
constructed as per the plans agreed by CHC and Cork Corporation. Seemingly the plans were 
changed by the corporation without notification to CHC.143 
The tension between the two authorities was evidenced well into the 20th century when 
Seamus Fitzgerald who had been a member of CHC had not been reappointed by Philip 
 
141 Report of the Ports and Harbours Tribunal, 1930, par.1314, p. 400. 
The history of harbours in the country showed that, prior to 1922, a general state of confusion 
and mismanagement existed. A tribunal was set up to examine the legislative, financial 
and charging powers of harbours and ports.  The general conclusions reached by the tribunal were 
incorporated in two recommendations, firstly, that the provisions of the various general acts relating 
to harbours should be replaced by a general consolidating act and, secondly, the Department of 
Industry and Commerce be given the general oversight of harbour administration. Parliamentary 
Debates, Dail Eireann, Tuesday, 19th January 1926 and Wednesday, 28th November 1945. 
142 Report of the Ports and Harbours Tribunal, 1930, pp. 46-79. 
143 Irish Builder, vol. XXIV 1882, p. 45. 
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Monahan the then city manager and he argued it was a purely political decision. The Cork 
Corporation was able to appoint several of its members to the harbour authority. 
Nevertheless, Fitzgerald regained his position on CHC board as he was chair of Cobh U.D.C.144 
and the holder of that position was entitled to attend CHC meetings.  
In a letter dated 1st July 1924 to the then chairman of CHC, J. J. Horgan, following the 
appointment of F. O’C Saunders as engineer, Fitzgerald argued that there were better 
qualified candidates than Saunders and he further stated that there were very few positions 
for republicans. He was referring to the situation where successful candidates were obliged 
to sign a declaration of loyalty to the Free State.145 
From the 1840 Municipal Corporation (Ireland) Act to the Local Government (Ireland) Act of 
1898 there was seen to be a broadening of the franchise with the commercial interest 
controlling 50% of municipal seats. One of the most fundamental pieces of legislation relating 
to local government was enacted in 1898, namely, the Local Government (Ireland) Act which 
opened municipal offices to working people.146 It is interesting to see what J. J.  
Horgan had to say on the matter. He was giving evidence to the Ports and Harbours  
Tribunal147 “…. until the Corporation became representative of the whole body of the citizens 
and naturally, the harbour board also became broader in its representation. Men were 
nominated to the board to represent labour. In 1820 when the board was constituted, the 




144 Quinlivan, Aodh, Philip Monahan: A Man Apart, (Dublin, 2006), p. 91; Cork City and County Archives, 
Seamus Fitzgerald Papers 1890-1975, PR/6/720(1). 
       145 Cork City and County Archives, Seamus Fitzgerald Papers 1890-1975, PR/6/712 (1). 
146 Reddick, Stephen, McQuay, ‘Political and industrial Labour in Cork 1899-1914’ (unpublished 
 M.A. thesis, University College Cork, November 1984), p. 3. 
147 Report of the Ports and Harbours Tribunal, 1930, pp. 46-79. 
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, the port of Cork began to handle increasing 
quantities of mail and it became the most important port of departure for transatlantic 
emigrants. This was due primarily to the arrival of the transatlantic steamship companies, 
which began to call to Ireland in 1859. Lee noted that Queenstown was not a priority for Cork 
Harbour Commissioners (CHC) and that CHC “concentrated on upriver improvement and 
development for the benefit of mercantile trade’’.148 To put it into context, the upper river 
had to be developed particularly in the 19th century given the poor state of navigation; it was 
deemed to be too expensive to deepen the lower harbour with the harbour engineer of the 
day quoting a figure of £120,000 to carry out the necessary works. Most of the port’s trade 
related to the upper river and most of the commissioner’s board were merchants whose trade 
was city-based. In the latter part of the century the election of Queenstown shipping 
interests, including members of the Scott family, to the board of CHC was important to 
Queenstown.  
The lower harbour, up to the middle of the 19th century, had a vital role in the economy of 
the port as the low draught of water in the river channel precluded all but small vessels from 
entering the city, as Philip Scott, pointed out, 776 vessels called at Queenstown in 1860 but 
that only 196 had discharged corn at the port with the remainder going on to other Irish ports. 
Scott also noted in the previous year 1,680 ships were calling to Queenstown and that 778 of 
 
148 Lee, William ‘Aspects of the history of Queenstown (Cobh) and the Transatlantic Trade 1800-1921’, 
(unpublished M.A thesis, University College Cork, July 2003), pp. 30, 47 and 84. 
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these had cargoes of corn.149 Philip Scott had greeted Queen Victoria in 1849 on behalf of the 
people of Cove and later in honour of the visit, the name Cove was changed to Queenstown. 
 
2: Galway Line 
 
By the 1850’s Irish mail to North America went to England initially and following political 
pressure in 1851, a parliamentary committee was set up to examine the possibility of 
establishing a mail service to North America from Ireland. Whilst Cork was seen to be a safe 
port, it was Galway that was recommended as the packet station for transatlantic 
communication, particularly as it had gained a railway connection to Dublin.  
A shipping company was subsequently formed in 1858 and it became known as the Royal 
Atlantic Steam Navigation Company and later as the Galway Line. The company was set up by 
Manchester businessman John Orrell Lever and Fr. Peter Daly, who was a member of Galway 
Harbour Commissioners. The Treasury had agreed to pay subsidies to the Galway Line to carry 
British mail to Newfoundland and further subsidies were being considered if mails were 
delivered to America. With the demise of the American Collins Line opportunities for other 
shipping lines had been created. The Inman Line was one of the companies that would 
benefit. The Inman Line had suggested that their operation would be more satisfactory than 
the Galway Line, even though there was supposed to be a public tender process, private 
negotiations were going on with the Galway Line. In February 1859, the Galway Line secured 
a contract from the minority government of Lord Derby which needed the support of Irish 
members.150 The contract brought immediate protests from lines such as Cunard and Inman 
 
149 Pettit (1996), p. 131. 
150 Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, HC Deb 08 April 1859 vol.153 cc1568-75. 
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and was criticised by a select committee which was set up by the new parliament.151 To 
compete with the Galway Line, Inman began to call at Queenstown and that contract was 
without subsidies, but probably had a commercial view in that they could foresee the Galway 
Line not succeeding in the long-run. That is exactly what happened. The service was not 
successful with delays being quite common; it ceased operations in 1864.152 
 
3: Royal Mail Steamers 
 
In 1859 it was announced that Queenstown was to be made a port of call for the Royal Mail 
steamers and the authority received confirmation of same from the British and North 
American Royal Mail Steam Packet Company. However, complaints started as early as 1860, 
when the Post Office complained about the loss of time in handling mail. Cork Harbour 
Commissioners response was to issue an instruction to keep a berth clear at all times for the 
use of mail tenders and this was to apply to Penrose Quay and also, Queenstown.153 By 1861, 
the revenue concessions granted to Inman and Cunard were extended to other companies 
and five years later Queenstown had become a major port of call for steamers; by 1867 Inman 
Line had three vessels calling each week, Cunard called twice weekly and the Guion Line 
fortnightly. These sailings were mainly during the busy emigrant season which was from 
March to September. By the middle of the 19th century, Queenstown was a prosperous town 
with a population of 9,000, with many dependants on shipping –shipping agents, chandlers, 
 
151 Brookfield, H.C., ‘Ireland and the Atlantic Ferry; A study in changing geographical values’,  
 Irish Geography, vol. 3, no.2 (1955), pp. 69-78. 
152 The Times, 26 August 1861; For a view from a Galway perspective see Timothy Collins, ‘The  
 Galway Line in context: A Contribution to Galway Maritime History ‘, Journal of the  
 Galway Archaeological and Historical Society’, vol. 46, (1994), pp. 1-42; Lee, William. ‘Aspects  
 of the history of Queenstown (Cobh) and the Transatlantic Trade 1800-1921’, (unpublished 
 M.A. thesis, University College Cork, July 2003), p. 39. 
153 O’Riordan, Patrick, Portraiture of Cork Harbour Commissioners (Cork, 2015), P. 304. 
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rope makers, lodging houses keepers, ‘runners ‘for emigrant ships and brokers.154 The 
shipping business of Queenstown seemed to revolve around certain firms and indeed 
families. Looking at 1871 names such as Scott, Cummins, and Seymour, were very prominent, 
notably, where Consuls, Agents for Underwriters, Ship and Emigration Agents, were 
concerned.  
 
4: Queenstown Local Authority 
 
Queenstown Town Commissioners came into being in January 1854 and just two months later 
there was a notice of a motion that the Cork Harbour Commissioners should fund local  
improvements through harbour dues collected at Queenstown.155 By September 1858 the 
Town Commissioners were requesting that the new pier ‘’be cleared as soon as possible’’. By 
1866 the Queenstown Town Commissioners were very much against proposed CHC legislation 
so much so that a special meeting was called and the motion adopted included the following 
wording: “.... legislation is against the interests of this port...”.156  
However, by July 1866 William Seymour, as chairman of Queenstown Town Commissioners, 
was appointed to the board of the Harbour Commissioners and this was provided for in the 
legislation of that year albeit that the appointment was in an ex-officio capacity. Seymour 
wrote to the local authority outlining his appointment and not forgetting his first allegiance, 
he said that his appointment could be “...useful in promoting the interests of the port and 
harbour ....and especially in relation to this town.’’. 
 
154 Pettit (1996), p. 182. 
155 Cork City and County Archives, Queenstown Town Commissioners, minutes of meetings, March 
6th, 1854, and September 6th,1858, TC/CQ/M001. 
156 Ibid, minutes of meetings, 14th February and 2nd July 1866, TC/CQ/M002 
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5: The Shipping Agents in Queenstown 
 
The agent for the Inman line was William Deane Seymour, a shipping agent for various 
countries including Honduras, Hawaii and Uruguay. He was the proprietor of the ‘Queenstown 
Gazette’ which had a very short life span as the paper published, in 1851, only 22 issues. As 
well, he was a prominent member of the Queenstown Town Commissioners and as chairman, 
he served on the board of Cork Harbour Commissioners, in an ex-officio capacity, from June 
1867 to June 1868. A relation of William was Nicholas George Seymour who was Belgian 
consul and represented Lloyd’s of London for over 22 years. He was principal of Seymour & 
Co. Shipping agency. Significantly, legislation was passed in 1866 which allowed the chairman 
of Queenstown Town Commissioners to be an ex-officio member of the Cork Harbour 
Commissioners board.157 However, it was not until 1883 that the lower harbour had 
representation in its own right, which came about as a result of legislation passed that year 
which allowed for the election of commissioners to represent the lower harbour.158 The same 
year, Queenstown Town Commissioners were arguing for a separate authority for the lower 
harbour but it was the 1883 legislation allowing separate representation that eased the 
growing tension between Queenstown interests and Cork Harbour Commissioners. Such 
tension between CHC and Queenstown was long lasting; in 1952 when Martin Corry T.D. said 
‘‘…there is only one harbour and that is Cobh harbour …’’ and as regards Cork Harbour 
Commissioners he stated: “…jealousy on the part of the interests is enshrined in the harbour 
board…”.159 Corry had also argued that facilities should be constructed at Cobh instead of 
Tivoli. Queenstown was replaced in name by Cobh in 1922.  
 
157  Cork Harbour Amendment Act 1866, Section 4.(29 & 30 Vict. c. 31). 
158 Cork Harbour Act, 1883, Section 37. (46 & 47 Vict. c. 171). 
159 Cork Examiner, 20th March 1952. 
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Nevertheless, the main ship agents in Queenstown, without doubt, were the firm James Scott 
& Co. Ltd., who had an important influence on developments in the town. James Scott was 
the founder of the company James Scott & Co. and his sons, George and Philip developed it 
into a very successful business. Scott’s were ship owners from 1821 and for a time owned as 
much as 6,000 tons of Cork registered tonnage and by the 1860’s the company concentrated 
on cross-channel shipping. The James Scott Company by the late 1840’s and early 1850’s was 
engaged in the transport of emigrants to Canada, America and Australia and in the decades 
that followed, they were acting as emigration agents for lines such as, Guion, White Star and 
Allan. They were also agents for different underwriters such as Austrian Lloyd’s and Liverpool 
Underwriters Association and as well, acted as ship agents. 
James W. Scott was chairman of the Cork Harbour Commissioners from November 1892 to 
November 1894 and was the grandson of James Scott, the founder of the company. He served 
for three terms as chairman of Queenstown Town Commissioners and acted as agent for the 
White Star Line. He was also consul for Chile, Brazil and Peru and vice-consul for some other 
countries. Between 1897 and 1905 he was the United States consul at Queenstown and was 
also the nephew of George Scott, who had served also, as harbour commissioner. George 
Scott had served as a mercantile representative on the board of the commissioners from 1847 
to 1866.160 James Scott took an active part in matters relating to CHC but the lower harbour 
and Queenstown were never far away from his attention. During his period as a commissioner 
matters discussed, particularly at Finance Committee meetings, included queries relating to 
tonnage rates, Liverpool Ship-owners Association and White Star Line, to name but a few. 
These would have been matters of interest to the family shipping company and in most cases; 
 
160 O’Riordan, Patrick, Portraiture of Cork Harbour Commissioners (Cork, 2015), pp. 60 and 81.  
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Scott would have attended the meetings. An interesting request was for a refund of port dues; 
Scott’s was acting as agent for a German company and the request was in connection with 
dues paid on coals supplied to the German Fleet. The request was refused by CHC.161 Similarly, 
in 1895 there were queries regarding White Star and Scott’s at that time were agents for the 
liner company. There is no doubt that the Scott organisation was astute in their commercial 
dealings with the harbour commissioners. At a Finance Committee meeting on the 5th May 
1902, there was a discussion regarding a proposal to erect oil tanks on the Great Southern 
and Western Railway property and the easement of a pipeline through the Queenstown 
Deepwater Quay. The consensus was to “move it upriver” with the proposal rejected and the 
harbour engineer instructed to find alternative sites. Scott was one of the main protagonists 
in opposing the proposal.162 Away from commercial activities, the Scott family were very 
involved in the building of municipal parks and certain terraces in Queenstown. 
 
6: The Inman, Cunard and White Star Lines 
 
The Inman Line had by 1857 decided to use Queenstown as a regular port of call. The first call 
to Queenstown was by the ‘’City of Manchester’’, in May 1859, en route from Liverpool to 
New York. Inman’s idea was to undermine the Galway Line which was offering a service 
between Ireland and America. In years to follow the emigration agent for the Inman Line was 
C.W Seymour, a harbour commissioner. In the 1860’s and 1870’s, the Liverpool, New York & 
Philadelphia Steam Ship Company which was universally known as the Inman Line was one of 
the major maritime enterprises on the North Atlantic. The premier routes served were from 
Liverpool to Philadelphia and New York, with feeder services developed from continental 
 
161 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of Finance and Law Committee, July 24th, 1893.  
162 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of Finance and Law Committee, May 5th, 1902. 
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ports such as Antwerp and this resulted in a wider casting of the net for cargo and 
passengers.163  
Between 1850 and 1852, the Inman Line decided to enter the emigrant trade using 
steamships which up to then was the exclusive market of the sailing vessels. Various wars 
meant that the Inman Line was called upon to supply vessels with the added disadvantage 
that there was a possibility their trade could be lost to a competitor. Nevertheless, Inman Line 
survived and when New York took the place of Philadelphia as a port of call, other lines 
followed suit, and with an increased number of calls, it became more financially advantageous 
for lines to call to New York. In February 1858, the American Collins Line ceased operations 
shortly after subsidies had been terminated and with a gap in the market, Inman availed of 
the opportunity and entered rate-cutting competition with Cunard.  
The Inman Line endured some setbacks, as in 1864 when the ‘’City of New York’’ became 
embedded on Daunt’s Rock. It was claimed that the Rock lay in the direct approach of 
steamers entering Cork Harbour and only offered clearance of 12 feet at low water.164 The 
inquiry that followed found that the first officer was at fault and considerable debate followed 
over the next few years at CHC board meetings and indeed, correspondence with the Irish 
Ballast Board regarding Daunt’s Rock. The Rock was some 4 to 5 miles from Roches Point and 
was outside the harbour limits. 
The American civil war concluded in 1865 and brought about a temporary decline in freight 
bound for America as the wartime demand slackened. The American economy suffered post-
war retrenchment with the knock-on effect on North Atlantic steamship lines; the Inman, 
 
163 Flayhart, William Henry, ‘The InmanSteamship Company Limited: Innovation and Competition  
 on the North Atlantic,1850-1886.’ in The Northern Mariner /Le marin du nord, xii, no. 4,  
 (October 2002), p. 29. 
164 Cork Constitution, 8th August 1875. 
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Cunard, National and Guion all had to reduce their sailings. Before 1867, the primary 
responsibility for the transportation of ocean mails was with the Admiralty. This was a carry-
over from the days of navy packets which carried mails to important areas of British concern. 
By the end of 1867, the responsibility for ocean mails was transferred from the Admiralty to 
the PostMasterGeneral (PMG) and with the change-over the Inman Line was successful in 
their bid to carry Canadian mails from Queenstown to Halifax on a fortnightly basis. Inman 
had beaten Cunard, who had held the contract since 1840, however with a reduced payment 
of £375 per voyage. The Inman Line also benefited financially from having a share of the Royal 
Mails that were being carried between Liverpool and New York. There was a renewal of 
economic prosperity after 1870, with Inman having 68 sailings and Cunard with 70 sailings 
but in terms of passenger numbers, Inman was the largest operation on the North Atlantic 
with 40,465 steerage passengers compared to Cunard’s 16,871.165 However, some major 
issues were facing the Inman Line. Firstly, there had been five major shipping disasters which 
affected the company. Secondly, in 1869 the compound engine was invented and perfected, 
so much so, that Inman had to re-engine almost its entire fleet. But the biggest challenge was 
the arrival on the scene of the White Star Line or Oceanic Steam Navigation Company Limited 
in 1871 and its very presence, within five years forced Inman into a major re-organisation and 
its very survival was threatened within fifteen years. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the 
line that had the greatest impact and influence on Queenstown was Cunard. 
Samuel Cunard, a prominent merchant and shipowner, was awarded an initial contract in 
1838 to carry transatlantic mails by steamer. Importantly, the contract carried a subsidy. With 
the help of Robert Napier, the Clyde shipbuilder and along with partners, Burns and McIver 
 
165 Flayhart (2002), p. 38. 
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he set up the British and North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. The service started 
with four wooden paddle steamers in 1840 and by 1847 the service was increased to a weekly 
sailing in each direction. The early Cunard steamers were regarded as uncomfortable with the 
passengers squeezed into the cramped spaces fore and aft. The dominance of the Cunard Line 
was initially challenged by the Collins Line, which had started with sailing ships but then 
switched to steam in the hope of getting a subsidy. Collins built a fleet of wooden paddle 
steamers and within two years was carrying more than 50% first-class passengers. Collins was 
seen to treat his passengers with comfort and elegance while Cunard, on the other hand, 
seemed to be more austere in style. Tragedy struck the Collins line in 1854 with the loss of 
the ‘’Arctic’’ and this was followed by the loss of the ‘’Pacific’’ some two years later. Collins 
lost his subsidy and eventually turned his attention away from shipping to iron and coal.166 
Cunard began their association with Queenstown in 1859 with some 22 sacks of mail and two 
cabin class passengers being embarked on the initial sailing.167 But Cunard was not happy as 
the following year in evidence to the Select Committee on Packet and Telegraph Contract 
Committee of 1860 Samuel Cunard argued that the Queenstown call made the sailing take 
longer.168 This was the start of Cunard disillusionment with Queenstown. 
Subsequently, Cunard over the decades expressed concern at the cost of calling to 
Queenstown and this was becoming evident as early as 1867 when discussions were taking 
place regarding a mail contract. John Burns of Cunard argued in evidence to a Select 
Committee that it would be difficult to maintain a satisfactory service from Liverpool to  
 
166 Whitney, Ralph, ‘The Unlucky Collins Line’, in American Heritage, volume 8, issue 2, 1957. 
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Ireland under such conditions.169 In 1868 the argument regarding substitution of subsidies by 
ocean postage rate carried on with Burns warning that Cunard would pull out of Queenstown 
if the Post Office would not accept the offers made by Inman and Cunard Lines.170 For almost 
thirty years the method of payment was by fixed subsidy which was to underwrite the cost of 
the vessels. By 1868 the PostMasterGeneral felt that the steamship vessels on the North 
Atlantic had developed trade enough so that the subsidy could be dispensed with in favour of 
one based on weights. The result was not as successful as the Post Office hoped for, nor as 
profitable as the lines had expected. The result was that in 1869 the old fixed-subsidy formula 
was reintroduced.171 Cunard, on the 29th October 1877, wanted to increase the payment for 
letters and newspapers and went as far to say that they would cease to call at Queenstown if 
the reply was unsatisfactory.172 The Queenstown call was it seemed constantly in question;173 
with the shipping community, of Queenstown, along with merchants becoming very nervous 
with the possibility that the mail steamers might cease to call at Queenstown.  
Subsidies seemed to be one method of survival on the sea, as was evidenced during the period 
1865 to 1874 when the US Congress was inundated with subsidy bills. The President approved 
an Act which gave the Commercial Navigation Company of New York monopoly for fifteen 
years carrying all European mails to Queenstown, Southampton and Bremen weekly or semi-
 
169 John Burns evidence to the Select Committee on Mail Contracts 1867, Q1363-4 in Lin,  
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weekly, but the PMG objected and countered with an offer of a contract to carry mail four 
times a week however the company never took up the offer.174 
Cunard was also mindful that he was losing ground to other lines and responded in the 1880’s 
with new vessels, the single screw, ‘’Umbria’’ and ‘’Eturia’’ and they were intended to be 
amongst the most powerful ships afloat. The decade saw the lines compete to produce the 
most advanced and luxurious vessels with the Inman Line’s “City of Paris”’ and the “City of 
London” being built in 1888 and not to be outdone, White Star in 1889 had the “Teutonic” 
and “Majestic” on display. But their days of influence were coming to an end with the arrival 
on the scene of the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika Lines which by 1903 saw 
Germany owning the four fastest ships crossing the Atlantic.175 The North German Lloyd was 
now carrying more first-class passengers than Cunard. Cunard to keep up with the other lines 
produced the larger “Campania” and the grander “Lucania” and from 1895 both vessels would 
call to Queenstown regularly.  
The 1890’s saw a period of improved shipbuilding technology with larger vessels working on 
the North Atlantic route but the lines felt that the ‘’old harbour equipment in Ireland was out 
of date’’ and the bad weather in winter on the North Atlantic also discouraged the call to 
Ireland.176 The Post Office found they were unable to control the homeward voyage of 
contractors and they saw that companies were reluctant to call to Queenstown as it was felt 
there was not sufficient business there. This situation culminated in Inman terminating their 
call to Queenstown in 1893. An indication of the size of the mail service market can be gauged 
by the numbers of mail bags carried by the mail packets to New York during the year 1898: 
 
174 Meeker, Royal., ‘History of Shipping Subsidies’, American Economic Association, 3rd Series, 
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from Liverpool, 57,331; from Queenstown, 65,498. The numbers landed were Queenstown, 
34,781; at Liverpool, 56,892.177 
Four years later in 1902, White Star was taken over by the banker J.P. Morgan and he was 
also very interested in taking over Cunard. This would mean that the major lines would be 
American owned which left the British government with the dilemma as to whether to allow 
the takeover of Cunard or rescue ‘’Cunard for the nation’’ through a large government  
subsidy.178 Around this time, what was seen as an embarrassing situation for Cunard occurred 
when the “Eturia” broke down in the middle of the Atlantic and had to be towed to the Azores 
by a tramp vessel owned by Morgan. The government eventually decided that Cunard could 
not be seen to be going into American hands so in 1903 an agreement was concluded 
between the PMG and the Cunard Company of which, the Board of Admiralty and the Board 
of Trade were interested parties. The contract increased the subsidy to the Cunard Company 
received for the carriage of American mails from £57,000 to £67,000 per year and also, there 
was a loan made to the company of £2,600,000 to increase the fleet by two extra ships which 
were to be used for this service.179 The two vessels concerned were to be the “Mauretania” 
and “Lusitania” which were to be in the 32,000-ton range. They were to be the most powerful 
and fastest transatlantic liners of the day and were expected to generate a top speed of at 
least twenty-four and a half knots which would beat the German liners, but the specification 
was to be approved by the Admiralty. In return, the Admiralty had a right to commandeer 
ships for use as cruisers, troopships or hospital vessels. On only her second Atlantic sailing, 
 
177 Information was given in reply to a Parliamentary Question. HC Deb 10th February 1899  
 vol. 66 c499.  
178 Hyde, Francis E., Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840–1973: A History of Shipping and  
 Financial Management, (Palgrave, 1975), pp. 145-47 
179 Herbert Samuel, PostMasterGeneral: HC Deb 14th August 1913 vol. 56 cc2662-755.  
 The debate included comments by M. P’s Muldoon and Redmond.  
 
 
                                                                        85 
the “Lusitania” journey time was under 5 days and brought the symbolic Blue Riband back to 
Britain.180 The following year 1904 saw the steam turbine-powered 20,000 ton ‘’Carmenia’’ 
built and by 1907 speeds of 20 knots were common on the Atlantic route. Liverpool Chamber 
of Commerce, on occasion, wrote to the PMG making the point that the fast Cunard steamers 
could go direct from Liverpool to New York without making the Queenstown call and that it 
would be more efficient for Cunard to give up Queenstown. In 1907, the chairman of the Cork 
Harbour Commissioners asked the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty was it possible 
that part of the Turbot Bank be removed. This was an effort to avert further liner company 
protests and objections. In the previous year, the Admiralty had given £20 million to Gibraltar, 
Malta, Portsmouth and other royal bases in the British Empire for improvements. The 
Admiralty rejected the argument on the basis that they did not fund commercial facilities.  
Cunard had during the first decade of the century regarded the entrance and anchorage, of 
Cork Harbour, as dangerous for their large ships-turning on the shoals bow and stern and had 
less than a fathom under the keel at the entrance at low springs.181  
The year 1907 was a momentous year for the American mails, the White Star Line decided to 
change its terminus from Liverpool to Southampton which meant that Cork was replaced by 
Plymouth on the eastbound voyages. The commissioners lobbied the Irish Members of 
Parliament and the PMG but to no avail and by 1910 the Cunard Line stopped calling into 
Queenstown for January, February and March. Critics of Cunard argued that it was on the 
grounds of inconvenience and the length of the journey, which was putting them at a  
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disadvantage with their competitors.182 Cunard said in February 1913, the company was 
considering the overall position regarding calls to Queenstown. It was maintained there was 
not sufficient clearance in the event of bad weather, as CHC were too late in carrying out the 
improvements required and in any event, mails embarked at Liverpool should sail direct to 
New York.183 In a letter from Cunard’s chairman to the PostMasterGeneral (PMG) dated the 
19th March 1913, it was suggested the calls to Queenstown should stop and specifically 
referred to an incident involving the ‘’Mauretania’’. The liner had suffered a delay of four 
hours as she had to wait for flood tide so that her bow would be brought abreast the harbour 
and that she could steam out. By the 10th April Cunard informed the PMG that the 
‘’Mauretania’’ and ‘’Lusitania’’ were not to enter the harbour and M. P’s from Liverpool, were 
suggesting that the call to Queenstown should be abandoned altogether. A subsequent letter 
of the 19th June 1913 from the General Manager of the Company referred to how unsafe the 
port was and gave the experience of the ‘’Lusitania’’ on the 29th December 1907 as an 
example. The commissioners in reply to the secretary of Cunard, pointed out that it was an 
error of the pilot that caused the incident and seemingly the company were happy as long as 
a severe reprimand was issued to the pilot concerned. It seemed clear at this stage that 
Cunard had decided that the large Cunard liners would not call to Queenstown. 
Correspondence from Cunard shows that a letter dated 25th August 1913 issued instructions 
to the effect that neither the “Lusitania” nor the “Mauretania” was to enter the harbour at 
Queenstown in future. The vessels were nevertheless to continue to halt outside the harbour  
 
182 “Cork Harbour Commissioners: Chronology of Interesting Events 1813-1992”. CHC  
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to collect and deposit mail whenever the weather permitted.184 The instruction came as the 
“Lusitania” resumed its cross Atlantic travels having spent the previous eight months in dry 
dock after trouble with turbines which required an overhaul of the vessel. 
The PMG had sought the opinion of the technical advisers to the Post Office, Board of Trade, 
and the Admiralty and they were of a similar view, in that, large vessels would be at risk in 
trying to enter the port, particularly, in bad weather. Factors such as the narrowness of the 
entrance to Queenstown harbour, the small depth of water, restricted area of anchorage, it 
was argued, would put vessels such as “Lusitania” and “Mauretania” at considerable risk. 
Considering the suspension of the American Mails the PMG maintained that mails from 
Belfast would require posting seven and a half hours earlier and that the south of Ireland 
would require the posting of mails no more than a day earlier. 
Critics of Cunard argued that the company had skillfully engineered the position and 
particularly how relevant correspondence was only laid before the House of Commons just as 
the House was going to prorogue. It was also argued that the vessel “Olympic” (White Star 
Line) had no specific problems entering or leaving the harbour, as the vessel was seen to be 
more manageable than the “Mauretania” and “Lusitania” particularly as the “Olympic” had 
reciprocating engines, even though she was longer and had bigger tonnage than the  
“Mauretania” and “Lusitania”.185 The ‘’Olympic’’ went on to serve as a troop carrier during 
World War 1.  
 
184 The instruction received by Cunard officials at Queenstown read: ‘Please note that after the  
 24th inst. the “Mauritania” and “Lusitania” will cease to call at Queenstown. We shall be  
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185 Report from the Queenstown Harbour Committee appointed by the Postmaster-General 
 to consider the omission of the call at Queenstown on the American Mail Service, pp. 54-55.  
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Irish M.P.’s made various arguments against the dropping of Queenstown, which included the 
breaking of a contract, loss of trade to the region and that, the largest ‘‘Dreadnoughts’’ of the 
navy frequently went into the harbour without danger. However, it was all to no avail or 
certainly, too late. The action of the Cunard company had drawn criticism from several Irish 
M.P.’s, among them John Redmond and his brother William who had repudiated the charges 
in Parliament against Cork Harbour’s shortcomings and had called for a local inquiry. Whilst, 
in 1912, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty paid a popular visit to the port, that 
year also saw Cunard ruling out the resumption of calls by both the “Mauretania” and 
“Lusitania”. Cunard had since 1840 a contract with the British government for mail service 
and the ending of the Queenstown stop galvanised political and business opposition in 
Ireland.186 Queenstown UDC regarded the decision of the Cunard Company as a gross 
violation of the terms of contract. 
Under the 1903 agreement, Cunard could have been fined for not collecting mail at 
Queenstown, however, there was also a clause in the agreement which stated that fines did 
not apply when events were outside of Cunard’s control. The PMG further argued that mails 
to America had increased considerably since the agreement came into operation and that the 
Cunard Company had not received any additional revenue. Another significant player in the 
American mail trade to Queenstown was the White Star Line. 
The White Star Line was originally founded in 1845 by Henry Threlfall and John Pilkington. The 
shipping line operated a fleet of sailing clippers, sailing from Britain to Australia. On 18th 
January 1868, the house flag and name of the White Star Line were purchased by Thomas 
 
186 Cunard discontinuing the Queenstown American mails connection was mentioned for  
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Ismay for £1,000. Thomas Ismay wanted to have a fleet of steamships and the first ship built 
for the White Star Line was the “Oceanic”, built by Harland and Wolff, Belfast in 1870 and at 
one time it was the largest ship afloat.187 Ismay had decided to work the North Atlantic trade 
and to do so would need new ships and he came to a mutually beneficial agreement with 
Harland and Wolff, that they would build the ships at cost plus a fixed 4 per cent. To help 
Ismay raise the capital, both Harland and Wolff bought a substantial number of shares in 
Ismay's company. The first White Star ship, “Oceanic”, was ordered in 1869 with the last 
vessel, “Georgic”, built in 1932. On the 23rd November 1899, Thomas Ismay died and by that 
time his son J Bruce Ismay had taken over as head of the White Star Line.  
Some of the White Star liners were able to siphon some of the passenger trade away from 
their competitors with the result other companies went looking for new tonnage. Several new 
liners came on stream for the Inman Line; however, there was difficulty in keeping up with 
the impressive White Star. Even though the years 1870 to 1872 were seen as boom years for 
all liner companies, by 1876, in the aftermath of a severe maritime depression, White Star 
and Inman had come to a sharing arrangement which had become an economic necessity. 
The Ismay ownership came to an end when White Star was bought in 1902 by John Pierpont 
Morgan as part of his shipping conglomerate International Mercantile Marine. 
 
7: The American Mails and the Queenstown Inquiry 1914 
 
Cork Harbour Commissioners in June 1907 were fearful of the American mails being lost to 
the harbour and to allay the liner companies misgivings about the harbour, James Long, 
Chairman of Cork Harbour Commissioners, led a deputation to meet the Parliamentary 
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Secretary of the Admiralty. Some royal bases had got funding, but the Admiralty rejected the 
request because Cork was a commercial port and consequently would not finance such 
operations. However, that year saw liner companies taking action that would have serious 
repercussions as regards American mails; this was when White Star changed their terminus 
from Liverpool to Southampton and replaced Queenstown by Plymouth on the eastbound 
voyages. This followed the withdrawal of the Inman Line in 1893. The reaction of the port 
authority was to have a resolution passed which called on the entire body of Irish members 
of parliament to oppose the withdrawal of the American mail service from Queenstown. 
Another deputation met the PMG in London to urge upon him the necessity of using his 
influence for the retention of Queenstown as the port of disembarkation of the homeward 
American mails. Three years later, in 1910, following discussions a scheme was approved by 
Cunard and White Star whereby CHC would extend the deepwater anchorage so that large 
liners including the “Lusitania”, “Mauritania” and the “Olympic” could swing to anchor at the 
same time. However, Cunard, essentially, ignored the agreement and said that for January, 
February, and March their mail liners eastbound on Wednesdays would not call at 
Queenstown. The announcement came by way of a press release which annoyed Cork 
Harbour Commissioners. A meeting was held in the Mansion House, Dublin on the 21st April 
1910 to protest at the action of Cunard in abandoning Queenstown as a port of call for their 
fast steamers. Deputations were sent to Dublin, London and on 3rd October a deputation was 
received by the PostMasterGeneral in Washington. The deputation included representatives 
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Representations were made at high levels in the United States with the former President of 
the United States Theodore Roosevelt promising to make representations on behalf of John 
Redmond and Captain Donelan, M.P for Cork East,188 whom he had met earlier in London.  
A late response from the Commissioners was to engage C.S. Meik, in 1913, to report on the 
state of the harbour entrance and liner anchorage for the reception of large liners. The report 
cost £22,000.189 The report was completed reasonably quickly, and its main 
recommendations were: 
(1) The improvement of the curve of the Western Entrance Channel by the removal of the 
Turbot Bank. (This had already been suggested to the Admiralty by CHC in 1907). 
(2) The widening of the deep-water area of the anchorage up to 2,600 feet. 
(3) The removal of the 35 feet patch in the anchorage. 
(4) The construction of a groyne at Corkbeg to improve tidal scours. 
Meik regarded the approach into the Queenstown harbour by either the eastern or western 
channel as being superior to the entrance at Liverpool as it was more sheltered from heavy 
gales whilst, as regards Southampton, he argued that the channels to Queenstown were much 
easier to navigate than that leading from the Solent round Calshott Castle up to Southampton 
docks. The plans were accepted by the commissioners and the work was to commence as 
quickly as possible. Meik’s recommendations were phrased in such a way to reassure the 
commissioners as to the suitability of the harbour for the liner traffic of the day. The report 
described both approach channels as affording easy access as well as being sheltered from 
the worst gales from the south and that the Turbot Bank, which had caused some problems 
in the western channel, could be removed by the process of dredging away the sand and 
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gravel of which much of the mass was composed. Improvements of this kind to the western 
channel was to give a very favourable approach to the harbour and one which the largest 
steamers could make use of. Changes in the bank would necessitate adjustments in the 
system of leading lights and buoys but in the end, the channel would compare very favourably 
with the channels up to Liverpool and Southampton, giving a minimum depth at low water of 
42 feet while at Liverpool the depth varied from 31 feet to 33 feet and at Southampton from 
35 feet. 
A new dredging programme along the Curlane Bank began in 1911 and continued to 1913. 
The commissioners saw that an improved tender service at Queenstown was required but 
Cunard and the other liner companies would not pay or indeed, contribute towards the 
provision of a new tender. 
By the autumn, CHC published extracts from various statements, including harbour pilots, 
outlining how Queenstown was a safe harbour.190 As well, the deputy harbourmaster also 
wrote referring to the harbour as being “a safe port and (was)…easy of approach....”.191 Earlier 
in July; a booklet was published by CHC pointing out the advantages of Queenstown as a port 
of call for American Mails. Yet, all these actions were merely part of a rear-guard action. 
Nevertheless, the commissioners-maintained contact, particularly with the PMG and in 
February 1914, the harbour engineer, harbour master and Mr Meik made representations 
outlining the improvements carried out and, more importantly, the future proposals for the 
liner traffic. Dredging had commenced following Meik’s recommendations but was stopped 
at the commencement of World War 1. (WW1.) Cork Harbour Commissioners files show that 
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there was no lower harbour improvement works carried out between August 1914 and July 
1918. 
Business interests regarded the Cunard decision as a blow to the entire region. J. J. Horgan 
mentions how for many years Cunard had used Cork Harbour as a port of call for its 
transatlantic liners and then proceeded to break its contract to land the eastbound mails at 
Queenstown. He also claimed that Cunard added ‘slander to bad faith’ by alleging that the 
port was unsafe for their new fast liners the “Lusitania” and the “Mauretania” when they 
announced that these ships would no longer call at Cork Harbour.192 He argued that the White 
Star Line had bigger ships and they had no problem with Cork Harbour. In the final analysis, 
Cunard decided that the call to Queenstown would cease and later in 1913, an All-Ireland 
protest meeting took place in Dublin; where it was decided to seek a meeting with the Prime 
Minister which took place subsequently in London and an Inquiry was held in May/June 1914 
again in London. The meeting, in Dublin, was convened by the Lord Mayor of Dublin and was 
attended by various representatives of local authorities and business interests. At the 
meeting, Sir. John Casement suggested independent communication lines should be 
established between America and Ireland. J. J. Horgan pointed out that Casement was very 
much involved in getting the German Line Hamburg-Amerika Line to call to Cork, as Casement 
saw this as an opportunity to renew contacts between Ireland and Europe. Casement had met 
the CHC chair Sir James Long and other members to discuss the project and on the 30th 
December 1913, the CHC board were going to organise a public reception for the initial liner 
call. The line requested that there be no public fanfare and Casement felt there was political 
pressure involved. By February 1914 the Hamburg-Amerika line formally announced they 
 
192 Horgan, J.J., From Parnell to Pearse (Dublin, 1948). p. 232. 
 
 
                                                                        94 
were going to abandon the project altogether with Horgan arguing that it was the British 
Foreign Office that vetoed the scheme.193 Coincidence or otherwise, decades earlier it was 
the Hamburg-Amerika line which was one of the German lines that were threatening the 
Cunard and White Star’s Atlantic domination.  
The impressive liner ‘’Lusitania’’ was to suffer tragic consequences. On the 7th May 1915, the 
Cunard liner ‘’Lusitania’’ was sunk by a German U-boat and at the Inquest, the deputy coroner 
J. J. Horgan, who was a prominent harbour commissioner, denounced the action as ‘’ wilful 
and wholesale murder’’. 194 There was a total of 1,201 lives lost.  
In 1914 an inquiry was set up, the terms of which included: “...circumstances under which the 
Cunard Company have discontinued their call ......and to consider ......by means of  
improvements ... (how) calls could safely be resumed.’’ 195 
The report stated that there was a “good service by very large boats.... still available” but that 
the advantage of the very large liners “had been lost to them”. Reference was made to Cunard 
vessels in the 20,000-ton class, which would still be calling to Queenstown and likewise, the 
White Star Line would call with similar size ships. 
The main argument in the report was that Queenstown has lost the American mail liners but 
still had large emigration liners calling regularly. Evidence was given to the committee by 
James Long, Chairman of CHC, J. H. Campbell, Queenstown Town Clerk and the CHC harbour 
engineer and the deputy harbour master. The CHC nautical and engineering representatives 
argued that the harbour approach and the entrance were navigable for large vessels, but the 
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committee argued that it was not for two large liners at the same time. The actual loss to CHC 
in financial terms was not disclosed to the committee and there was a clear emphasis that 
the real loss to Ireland was from a tourist point of view. In fairness to the committee, the 
actual loss in respect of tourism was never quantified. The chairmen of Cunard and White 
Star, in evidence, argued that there was no need for the call to Queenstown to be reinstated. 
Similar evidence was given by the respective captains of the “Mauretania” and “Olympic”. 
Not surprising the report did not support the reintroduction of the large liners calling to 
Queenstown. 
A campaign to develop a new port on the western seaboard had been given fresh impetus by 
the decision of the Cunard Company to end its use of Queenstown as a stop-over port for its 
steam liners. Against this backdrop, an editorial in The Freeman’s Journal argued that without 
the provision of a new port Ireland risked being side-lined from the most important trade 
route in the world. The newspaper argued that there was no shortage of potential locations 
to develop such a port, but much of the discussions centred on the relative merits of Galway 
and Blacksod Bay. Of the two, Galway’s case had been more strongly made. “It would be more 
suitable to Dublin, and, in my opinion, be the better scheme of the two in every respect”, 
George Byrne, Chairman of the Dublin Port & Docks Board, said. 196 But nothing came of the 
discussions. 
 
8: Pilotage  
 
Pilotage is an integral part of port and harbour activity and pilotage activity in Cork harbour 
is centred at Cobh. The pilotage superannuation fund for pilots was set up in 1851, the pilots 
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were never regarded as employees but were regarded as fee-earning and their ‘employment’ 
was based on the renewal of their licence every year.  
The Queenstown pilots used cutters belonging to several owners each receiving portion of 
the pilot’s earnings. Another portion went to the ‘hobblers’-men employed to work the boats. 
The remainder was divided among the pilots attached to each boat. This system meant that 
each boat operated in competition with the others, with the result that the service was 
irregular and the boats themselves were in a questionable condition.197 Best off were the 
transatlantic pilots at Queenstown who were employed at good salaries to pilot the large 
liners. 
In 1890, Cork Harbour Commissioners, as a pilotage authority, were concerned about pilot 
boats, none of which were controlled or owned, by the authority. They had been legally 
advised that CHC would be working outside the scope of their acts by contributing towards 
the purchase of privately-owned pilot boats, but they could licence the boats if the boat 
owners had formed a company. As well, Cork Harbour Commissioners sought a new pilotage 
act as licensed pilots could not operate outside the limits of the pilotage district. Vessels were 
arriving off the harbour having got their orders from signal stations on the headlands and as 
a result, were not obliged to enter the pilotage district and importantly to the harbour 
authority, no pilotage fees were paid and with unlicensed pilots, operating outside the 
pilotage areas the commissioners felt they could not make regulations.  
By 1892 a new act came into being, the Cork Harbour (Pilotage Act) 1892 was significant as it 
extended the pilotage area, from its then position of Poer Head to Cork Head and Knockadoon 
Head on the northeast to Mizen Head on the south-west, some 1500 miles. The act was seen 
 
197 Pettit (1996), p. 196. 
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to have answered many of the Board’s anxieties and also allowed CHC to act as the pilotage 
authority and purchase pilot boats. 198 By 1895, the commissioners were investing in new 
boats, a new pilot boat “Aileen” was built by Queenstown and Passage Docks Company and 
another boat was purchased in 1909. 
Pilotage was very much in need of reform particularly as the number of pilots in 1893 
amounted to 55 but declined over the years to 38 in 1903, 18 in 1943 and 15 in 1963. The 
number of pilots employed by the Authority remained at a similar level for the next fifty years. 
The same period also saw that with fewer ships calling to the harbour it was decided to reduce 
the number of pilot stations from 4 to 2. 
The Pilotage Act of 1913 was a general consolidation act and made provision for pilot’s 
representation on the Pilotage Committee. The commissioners, under the act, had submitted 
to the Board of Trade a scheme in which certain areas of the pilotage district would be 
compulsory and financially beneficial to the authority. 199 
 
9: James Long: Queenstown native and Harbour Authority Executive 
 
Long was to be a central figure in the history of Cork Harbour Commissioners and, an 
influential harbour commissioner who would go on to be secretary of the harbour authority. 
In 1898 Long defeated the Unionist candidate Savage French in the local elections of that year. 
Savage French was very prominent in shipping circles in Queenstown and had been chairman 
of the Queenstown Naval Dwelling Co. Ltd. Long went on to serve on the Queenstown Town 
Commissioners and as ex-officio chairman was able to sit on the board of Cork Harbour 
 
198 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meetings, 1892-1895.  
199 O’Riordan (2015), pp. 313 to 23. 
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Commissioners. He was elected and served as chairman of Cork Harbour Commissioners from 
1901 till 1916 when he was appointed secretary and from 1922 was General Manager. He was 
knighted in 1910 but relinquished the honour in 1920 as a protest at the treatment of Terence 
MacSwiney. 
In his evidence to the Queenstown Committee in 1914 Long mentioned he was chairman of 
the harbour authority for about 15 years and an “ordinary member for about 22 years”. 
Long said that he lived about 300 feet above sea level and had the opportunity to see the 
vessels entering and leaving the harbour and could see the importance of shipping to  
Queenstown.200  
In 1922 the Cork Examiner reported that Long’s grasp of detail and constructive criticism was 
very beneficial to the port and indeed, the city.201 He had significant influence in matters 
relating to the port and Queenstown. An example of such influence was when Long was 
chairman of the Law and Finance Committee on the 20th January 1902, there was one 
recommendation regarding salaries: “... that John Farrell clerk in the Queenstown office is 
increased from 15/- to 20/- per week”. This amounted to a 33.33% increase in salary and that 
was the only recommendation. 
 
10: Deepwater Quay, Queenstown (DWQ) 
 
 
With the economy of Queenstown benefitting from the mail service, there was now an 
apparent need for more quay space in Queenstown and legislation was passed in 1877 
permitting the construction of a Deepwater Quay (DWQ) which was subsequently built in 
 
200 Report from the Queenstown Harbour Committee appointed by the Postmaster-General  
 to consider the omission of the call at Queenstown on the American Mail Service. H.M.S.O, 1914  
p. 54.  
201 Cork Examiner, 18th September 1928. 
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1883 and this allowed American mails to be despatched and troops to embark during the Boer 
War and subsequently, WW1. Queenstown interests had pressed for many years for the 
erection of such a quay but to no avail as the harbour authority only agreed when there was 
a similar need for deep-water quays in Cork city. The DWQ quay was built under the provisions 
of the 1877 Cork Harbour Act. The quay was built in front of the Great Southern and Western 
Railway Company’s terminus at Queenstown. The successful tender was in the name of John 
Delaney and was awarded on the basis that the foundations should be dredged without 
charge to the contractor and that filling at the back of the quay-wall was to be supplied free 
of charge by the commissioners. The final cost amounted to £34,188.4.0 with the length of 
the quay front 600 feet. If vessels called to Queenstown to embark troops there was no port 
charges and charges only occurred when there was cargo aboard the vessels. Barry goes as 
far as to say that “… American Mails are now landed at and despatched from this quay, and 
Her Majesty’s troops are embarked from the railway into troopships lying at the quay”.202 
DWQ Income amounted to a modest £756 in 1876, increasing to £1,115 in 1880 and £2,205 
by 1890 however 1900 saw income marginally decline to £2,130. DWQ income increased 
substantially in the following decades to reach £4,028 in 1920 and £4,927 in 1925. It is 
important to note that during the years of WW1, income dropped from £2,907 in 1915 to 






202 Barry, Philip, ‘The Deep Quays in the Port of Cork’, Minutes of the proceedings of the Institution  
 of Civil Engineers, vol. 100, January 1890, part 2. pp. 324-25.  
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11: Anchorage and Admiralty dues 
 
There was additional income in respect of liners which was known as anchorage dues and this 
was in situations where liners which were not able to come into the inner harbour waited at 
anchorage. Needless to mention the harbour authority charged tonnage rates on these 
vessels. This income up to the late 19th century was classified as port dues and from the early 
years of the 20th century became known as anchorage dues. A significant portion of the 
anchorage dues would have been from emigrant ships when liners were at anchorage and it 
would have been common for tenders to bring emigrants and the mails to and from the  
liners.203 
The anchorage tonnage income over the 25 period 1876-1900 saw income at its highest in 
1880 at £4,153 and income was to decline appreciably over the decades to reach a low of 
£2,282 in 1896. However, by 1901 income in respect of anchorage dues reached £2,845 and 
by 1909 and had reached £5,193 but dropped significantly subsequently to reach the low 
figure of £878 in 1920 but had recovered by 1925 to reach £4,769, which was at the 1913 
level. 204 
As with DWQ income, anchorage charges did not get any rate increase during the period, 
unlike the general tonnage which had a substantial increase in 1883 when the foreign rate of 
3d per ton increased to 1/- per ton. There was no significant correlation between DWQ and 
Anchorage income over the period with DWQ income increasing and anchorage declining 
 
203 Daire Brunicardi, Former Lieutenant Commander, Irish Naval Service and Senior Lecturer, National 
Maritime College of Ireland, in an e-mail dated 25th July 2018, states in relation to emigrant ships. “… 
it was very rare for the large passenger ship to enter the harbour. They usually anchored a couple of 
miles off Roches Point … The main factor would have been time, getting a large ship into the harbour 
and anchoring would be a slow process, adding 1.5 to 2 hours each way”.  
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during the period. There was little emigration during WW1 and of course, the American mails 
had ceased to operate during the war years and both these factors are evidenced particularly 
in anchorage tonnage. It is difficult to see a correlation between emigrant numbers and 
anchorage dues however it can be assumed that most of the anchorage dues were from 
emigrant ships. 
As outlined, British troops embarked from the railway into troopships lying at the DWQ in 
Queenstown however, it seems that the British Government was slow to pay their dues 
particularly where dues relating to cargo were concerned and this is evidenced by the note 
that appears in the accounts ended 31st July 1923 and reads:  
“There are outstanding claims against the Admiralty for Dues on British Government vessels 
portion of which is disputed and disallowed by the Admiralty”. The note also refers to 
accounts which the Admiralty had not sanctioned for payment.205 Conlon, in his report on 
Cork Harbour Commissioners departments, said that as at 31st January 1922 there was an 
amount of £48,614 outstanding and that the Admiralty debt was accumulating since the start 
of the war. He also points out that there was “no real effort made when new debts were being 
passed through the books, to obtain an acknowledgement of liability from the officer in 
charge…”.206 The harbour authority’s financial and debtors control left a lot to be desired.  
In auditor’s reports for year’s post-1922, there is a reference to the loss of tonnage and goods 
rates and one of the reasons attributed was the “stoppage of the railways for a considerable 
time”. This was a reference to the disruption to rail traffic during and after the civil war. 
 
205 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, auditors reports and accounts, year ending 31st July 1923, 
p. 9.  
206 Report for Cork Harbour Commissioners. “Report on the Organisation and Management of  
 the Several Departments”. Presented by Michael V. Conlon, (Cork, 1922), p. 9. 
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12: Conclusion 
 
There is the argument put forward by ports that it is their respective regions that benefit more 
than individual ports from liner or cruise traffic. In that context, cognisance should also be 
taken of the loss of tourist traffic to the region as a result of the demise of the American mails. 
It was the loss of the tourist traffic to Ireland that brought about the various protests and  
deputations evidenced at the Queenstown Inquiry.207 
As well, Cunard had for decades expressed concern at calling to Queenstown on cost 
grounds.208 Cunard at every opportunity was looking to criticise the entrance to the harbour 
and even, in 1913 when Cunard wanted to by-pass Queenstown, one of the arguments made 
by the company related to an incident that took place some six years earlier, in 1907. If Melk’s 
report were completed earlier and the necessary developments carried out would the liner 
companies and Cunard, in particular, have ceased to call at Queenstown? I would have grave 
doubts as to whether Cunard would have stayed, more so, as Inman had pulled out in 1893. 
Whether the judgment of the commissioners was an error in the whole debate is difficult to 
say for while their delay in carrying out improvements makes them culpable or at least, 
afforded another excuse to the liner companies. Still, Cork Harbour Commissioners were 
aware that the emigration traffic was an important source of income to them and this was 
recognised by not increasing the rate per ton on anchorage vessels for decades, unlike general 
port tonnage.  
Speed was the only advantage that Cork had to offer, and this was whittled away by the 
evolution of the giant high-speed liners which destroyed the wider advantages of the 
 
207 Report from the Queenstown Harbour Committee appointed by the Postmaster-General  
 to consider the omission of the call at Queenstown on the American Mail Service. H.M.S.O, 1914 
208 Statement by Post Office in December 1886, see POST29/432 Pkt158N/1887 and CA D42/CA41.  
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westward position and as well, the speed of the ocean liners was increasing every year. 
Subsequent developments in Atlantic shipping merely showed that the actual events were 
inevitable.  
Maybe there is an element of truth in the argument that the reason the steamers called to 
Queenstown was purely economic as the town was ideally situated between the Liverpool 
and New York routes and not, as Lee points out, due to a lack of a marketing strategy by the 
commissioners. As regards American mails Brookfield argued that the harbour was excellent 
but had a limited deep-water area and Cork Harbour Commissioners were slow to spend 
money on necessary improvements in the lower harbour. 209 This, he argues, was a major flaw 
in the commissioner’s management of the port, as the trouble with the mail steamers had 
been brewing for years with the result the major lines by-passed Queenstown. It has been 
argued, with some justification, that the harbour authority was slow to become alert to the 
pressures of modernisation in terms of speedy transmission of mails as well as cargo. An 
alternative view would be that the harbour authority with its board consisting of city-based 
businessmen felt that the capital expenditure required for the lower harbour would be 








209 Lee (2003), pp. 30, 47 and 84; McCarthy, Tom, ‘American mails and Queenstown 1850-1915’ 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
By 1800, the port was in a poor state of maintenance and was described as consisting of river, 
marsh, channels and with an urgent need to improve and invest in infrastructure.210 Before 
1813, many quays were built in a piecemeal fashion with individuals carrying out the 
necessary repairs, having received permission from Cork Corporation, and much of this work 
was carried out between 1800 and 1808. Such quays bore the names of the developers-
Penrose, Lapp, and Anderson and were found later to be have been built without proper 
foundations and not laid at sufficient depth.211 There was inadequate capital expenditure 
spent on the port’s infrastructure from the late 1770’s and the local authority carried out little 
quay maintenance. In 1813, only small vessels drawing 11 feet of water could get to Cork city 
and then at high water and on berthing at Cork they had to be aground on a gravel bottom to 
discharge. Between Passage and Cork, it was only 3 feet deep in places with large vessels 
being unable to proceed to the city and having to unload cargo, which was taken to Cork 
subsequently by lighters. All of this added to the time and cost of vessels visiting the port. 
 
In 1800, Cork port was unregulated as regards shipping activities and had no port authority 
structure. The port was under the control of Cork Corporation, the municipal authority, in 
terms of financing, investment and shipping matters. The corporation had benefitted from 
the growing incomes of a prosperous city with revenues increasing from £900 in 1715 to 
about £1,200 by 1732 and had reached £7,000 by 1820.212  
 
210 O'Sullivan (1937), p. 148. 
211 McCarthy (1949), p. 50. 
212 McCarthy (1949), p. 60. 
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A first step to improve the port’s infrastructure was the passing into law of The Butter 
Weighhouse Act of 1813 under which commissioners were appointed to improve the ‘harbour 
and river of Cork’.213 Significantly, twenty-one merchants of the city were appointed as 
commissioners. These merchants along with the mayor and both high sheriffs made up the 
24 commissioners. One third (1/3) of the fees received by the Weighmaster from the butter 
trade in the city went to the commissioners with the purpose to deepen, widen and improve 
the harbour and river of Cork. When the first Cork Harbour Commissioners (CHC) board was 
appointed in 1813 the membership resembled that of the protestant-controlled corporation 
structure; if you include Freemen, Friendly Club, Brunswick Club members and others their 
membership amounted to over 54% of the board. Quakers amounted to 21% and importantly 
the Commercial Buildings organisation amounted to 50%. In commercial terms brewing, 
shipping, butter, sugar, and timber interests amounted to 54% of the 1813 board 
membership. Even though harbour commissioners were appointed under the 1813 act Cork 
Corporation were seeking a share of port revenue but the commissioners resisted this 
successfully.214 The following year, in 1814, the infamous ‘cocket’ tax was imposed as another 
form of revenue and was regarded as simply a tax on trade and the act noted the need for  
investment in port infrastructure.215 By 1815, shipping interests were very concerned about 
the state of the quays and it became clear that significant expenditure was required to rectify 
the neglect of earlier years. 
Nimmo, in 1815, was very critical of the condition of the quays, which he referred to as “... 
mostly imperfect masses of rubble stone...”. Nimmo’s report identified for the commissioners 
 
213 The Butter Weighhouse Act of 1813. (53. Geo, 111.c.70). 
214 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, 10th June 1819. 
215 Statutory Instrument No. 274/1947 - Harbours Act, 1946 (Abolition of Cocket and Entry Tax at Cork Harbour) Order, 
1947. For a full history of this tax see Lantry, Mary, ‘The Cocket tax in Cork; a tax in the context of 
its time and place’ (unpublished M.A thesis, University College Cork, 2018). 
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the main structural issues and possible solutions facing the port authority.216 However, the 
cost of the works was seen to be prohibitive. It was clear to the board that dredging had to 
be the way forward. Saunders maintained that if funding had been provided for Nimmo’s 
proposals the port’s infrastructure would have been built sooner, with both McCarthy and 
Pettit of a similar view. Saunders was the port’s harbour engineer from 1933 to 1960. 
However, it must be noted that in such a scenario increases in port charges would not have 
been acceptable to the board of CHC. As well, It has been argued that the completion of the 
Navigation Wall, was at the expense of other quay projects and its benefit was questioned by 
many; the development of the Wall had extended for fifteen hundred yards below the Custom 
House but had to be discontinued due to lack of funding.217 Applications were made for 
funding but to no avail. It has been argued that expenditure on the Weighouse could have 
been used for the completion of the ‘New Wall’ along with other developments. A third of 
yearly income dedicated to improving the river was insufficient to maintain the quays. 
The inadequacies of the 1813 and 1814 acts led to the enactment of the Cork Harbour 1820 
Act which constituted the Cork Harbour Commissioners as a port authority. There was no 
capital funding forthcoming from the Government and having been told that any 
maintenance should be financed from the port’s resources, it was not the most auspicious of 
starts for the new harbour authority. Under the act, the total number of members of the 
board were 35. Five would be ex-officio, (Mayor, High Sheriffs and Members of Parliament). 
Thirty members would be elected by the Cork Corporation: of which five would be City Council 
members, and twenty-five members representing the mercantile community of the city.218 
 
216 Nimmo, Alexander, Report to the Harbour Commissioners on the Means of Improving the 
 River and Harbour of Cork (Cork, 1815). 
217 Saunders, F. O’C, ‘The Development of the River Port of Cork City’, The Institution of Civil 
 Engineers of Ireland, vol. 82, March 1956, p. 120.; McCarthy (1949); Pettit (1996). 
218 Cork Harbour Act 1820. (1. Geo.iv.c.52).  
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Whilst there were several, acts relating to the structure of the board it was the 1820 act that 
was the primary legislation and remained in operation till the 1946 Harbours Act. Importantly, 
the new act outlined, how receipts and payments were now entirely the responsibility of the 
commissioners.  
 
Investment in dredging equipment was to be the initial priority of CHC and the first dredger 
was purchased from Shoreham Harbour Authority (a 12hp machine). By 1828, 23,000 tons 
had been raised and by 1832, 182,877 tons had been dredged. A second dredger was bought 
in 1839 to accelerate the deepening of the riverbed; with another dredger built in 1851 at the 
local Lecky’s yard for £5,600 and this was to deepen the channel from Blackrock to Cork. There 
were drawbacks in that the dredged material was dumped behind the Navigation Wall and in 
time swept out to the riverbed. Between 1857 and 1864, a total length of 18,580 feet of quays 
was piled. Dredging produced a channel 11 feet deep from Horse Head (near Passage) to Cork. 
By 1884 the NorthDeepwaterQuay (NDWQ) then had a length of 1,400 feet with 20 feet l.w.o 
s.t (low water at spring tides) and the SouthDeepwaterQuay (SDWQ) had 600 feet in length 
and 23 feet l.w.o.s.t. (low water at spring tides). Some decades later, inefficiencies were 
identified by Conlon, who was critical of the dredging operations. Conlon found that figures 
regarding dredging loads were not reliable and “therefore calculations of the average cost of 
dredging per ton, based on such figures are worthless”.219 Nevertheless, the dredging 
programme was seen as a success in the development of Cork port particularly as 1,277,502 
tons were dredged, in the 10 years ended 1849. Having served the commissioners as secretary 
for nearly fifty years, Wm. Donegan, on his retirement in 1916 said the achievement of the 
 




                                                                        108 
half century can be measured in ‘’feet of dredged river”.220 All this was in a period when the 
authority had to keep pace with issues such as the ever increasing length and draught of ships.  
 
By 1846 more than half of the potato crop was unusable and widespread hardship was felt 
among the rural and urban poor. A relief committee in March 1846 organised the distribution 
of Indian meal, to the poor and started schemes of public works. In respect of the port, the 
commissioners were tasked with overseeing the importation of Indian corn which was to be 
shipped from the United States and Cork became the reserve depot for the whole country. 
Reflecting the inadequacies of Cork and its port, the ships that arrived could only discharge 
part of their cargo at Haulbowline and had to be further lightened at Passage before 
proceeding to Cork.221 The cost of lighterage was estimated at 2/6 per ton. Yet it was not until 
1846 that the commissioners became overly concerned with the Famine catastrophe. The 
Commissary General, Hewetson, asked for remission in dues payable on cargoes. The board 
agreed that the American relief food vessels arriving in Cork would have their dues remitted. 
The Famine period was nevertheless significant in terms of the volume of shipping in the port 
and generating finances for the authority; with tonnage and imports, during the fifty years 
ended 1849, at their highest in 1847 and 1849.  
 
 As outlined in Appendix 4.1 income increased by almost 570% between 1830 and 1900, of 
which imports increased in each ten year period. Likewise, tonnage, increased except for the 
period 1890-1900. Exports on the other hand only increased by 105% in the 70 year period. 
 
220 CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, minutes of board meeting, May 1st, 1916. Donegan 
made these comments during his resignation speech. In the early decades of the 20th century coal 
became a large cost when dredging was disposed at sea.  
221 Pettit (1996), p. 179. 
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As outlined earlier ballast income had been recorded in gross terms for many years and 
sometimes the surplus was also shown under income. This distorts any analysis of ballast 
income and the total income shown in Appendix 4.1 does not include ballast income or 
surplus. The end result shows the importance of tonnage, Imports and exports to the port. 
There were exceptional items in the years 1849 and 1880 which distorted the financial picture 
for relevant years. 
 
Up to the mid-1820’s, the tonnage of ships entering and leaving Irish ports tended to be more 
or less the same; however, from 1824 there was a sharp drop in tonnage cleared which was 
substantially lower than tonnage entering. This is evident in the case of Cork port with figures 
inwards and outwards similar up to 1824 and tonnage outwards declining from 163,000 tons 
in 1820  to 106,000 in 1825.222 Solar points out that this change did not come about as a result 
of the 1825 Customs union with Britain but it had more to do with the introduction of 
steamships and how tonnage was counted.223 After the steamships appeared many colliers 
seem to have returned in ballast. During the mid-1820s the gap between clearances and 
entries of sailing ships opened up just as steamers started to be introduced. This gap widened 
as steamers became more prevalent. The introduction of steamships on the Irish Sea in the 
1820’s had many important effects on the Irish economy, particularly as steamships also 
changed channels of distribution.224   
There are indications that the economy was on an upward trajectory up to the mid 1820’s. 
The value of butter exports from Ireland increased by 42% between 1806 and 1824, with Cork 
 
222 http://www.dippam.ac.uk/eppi/documents/ (DIPPAM: Documenting Ireland: Parliament, People 
and Migration). (Account of Imports and Exports of Port of Cork, 1825-31; Tonnage of Ships, 1816-30). 
223 Solar, Peter M., ‘Shipping and economic development in nineteenth-century 
 Ireland’, Economic History Review, LIX, 4 (2006), p.721. 
224 Solar (2006), p.726. 
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port a major contributor. Butter exports in subsequent years declined but recovered by the 
1830’s. By 1825 Cork’s butter exports in value terms amounted to 62% of total exports but 
declined during the years 1826-28 and had recovered to reach 68% by 1831.225 
 
The tonnage of shipping entering and leaving Ireland grew rapidly from the late eighteenth 
century until the mid-1870s, after which there was a distinct slowdown. This slowdown is 
reflected in Cork tonnage, which in 1873 amounted to 678,234 and by 1901, had reduced to 
606,392. Nevertheless, Cork ship tonnage in 1870 amounted to 25% of total income and had 
increased to 40% by 1900. It is worth noting that from 1867 harbour dues were payable under  
legislation passed that year on all vessels entering the port and, not as heretofore, only on 
vessels reporting at the Custom House. This meant a major increase in revenue. The Custom 
House offices were built in 1818 and were subsequently leased to CHC, in 1904, from the 
Commissioners of Public Works for a term of 999 years. The extension which included the 
new boardroom was completed in 1906. 
Revenue from imports suffered badly during the years 1832-1835 but it was not until 1840 
that there was a marked improvement; revenue from imports in 1869 amounted to 41% of 
total income and declined to a level of 36% in 1891. Subsequently, imports as a percentage 
of total income increased almost yearly so that by 1900 it had reached 40% with the revenue 





225 http://www.dippam.ac.uk/eppi/documents/ (DIPPAM : Documenting Ireland: Parliament, People 
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Table 4. 1 Cork Harbour Commissioners Income 1861-1900 
YEAR  IMPORTS EXPORTS TONNAGE Total 
  £ £ £ £ 
1861 9047 2984 5356 17387 
1866 7708 3415 5740 16863 
1870 10887 4156 6785 21828 
1875 10995 4351 6882 22228 
1880 12760 5212 9237 27209 
1885 13261 4682 16426 34369 
1890 12837 4213 15972 33022 
1895 16810 5333 17539 39682 
1900 15723 4107 15758 35588 
Return: % 74% 38% 194%   
Source: CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, the detail was adapted from the  
annual accounts of Cork Harbour Commissioners, 1861-1900 
 
Quay expenditure along with dredging costs consistently amounted to over 60% of total 
expenditure during the 19th century period. This expenditure mostly related to the upper 
river. The second quarter of the nineteenth century was an important phase of development 
and investment for the port, and many of the quays built remain in situ and constitute a 
defining feature of the port’s history and character. 
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 allowed for considerable deduction from the registered 
tonnage of steam vessels in respect of space occupied by propelled machinery. Under the 
1894 Act, the reduction in tonnage calculation was a benefit to port users but seen as a loss 
of income to port and harbour authorities. Total assets of Cork Harbour Commissioners were 
valued at £32,000 in 1868, £40,000 in 1869 and £49,000 in 1870. By 1872 plant was valued at 
£44,000 and by 1876 £66,000. By 1900 total assets were valued at £337,000 and comprised 
mainly of Estate £205,000 and investments valued at £66,000. With the significant 
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expenditure works undertaken by the Cork Harbour Commissioners, particularly regarding 
quays and coupled with the extensive dredging programme it was obvious that borrowings 
had to be undertaken. The first account of mortgages begins in 1872/1873 with the amount 
of £40,000 appearing in the financial accounts.  
 
A significant shift took place in the religious makeup of the mercantile members of the board 
during the 1870-1900 period as is illustrated in the following table. 
Table 4. 2 CHC Mercantile Members 1870-1900 
Mercantile Members  
Year Catholic Protestant  
1870 43% 57%  
1900 56% 44%  
 
  Source: O’Riordan, Patrick, Portraiture of Cork Harbour Commissioners  
(Cork, 2015). 
 
This slow shift reveals the growing power and influence of the Catholic middle classes in 
running the harbour, but the Protestant influence was still strong at the end of the nineteenth 
century, reflecting its significant over representation within the Cork city establishment. 
Within the port, the Protestant ownership of a significant share of the steamship companies 
at this stage had a strong influence on the composition of the board. A patriarchal structure 
was very much to the fore in the operation of the board particularly where operations and 
staffing were concerned, and nepotism was part and parcel of managing the authority. 
 
It was not until the 1860’s and later that the investment provided dividends. Shipping was 
now able to come up the river without the aid of lighters making imports more price  
competitive. In the case of Cork, imports were seen to grow over the century, unlike exports. 
It could be argued that the evidence of imports increasing could be an indication that 
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consumption was rising from increased living standards in the port and its agricultural 
hinterland and was more important than the exports generated by agricultural and industrial 
production. Illustrating this viewpoint, imports between 1870 and 1901 increased by 40% 
with exports remaining static. With a combination of borrowing and increased income from 
imports, the state of the harbour improved significantly for shipping coming up into the city. 
The period between the 1860s and the end of the nineteenth century, therefore, stands out 
as the critical period in the development of the city quays and the channel up from Passage, 
in addition to the development of Queenstown for American mails and migrant traffic. In this 
window, the Cork Harbour Commissioners were able to mobilise sufficient capital resources 
to shape much of the infrastructure of the port and harbour which we can still see today. The 
increase in income generated by imports allowed the authority to invest in infrastructure. To 
illustrate the importance of imports to the port during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century, import revenue increased by 43%, while exports declined by 6% when income overall 
was increasing by 13%. It is evident that CHC was able to exploit rising import revenue from 
a range of bulk commodities, and this helped to place the ports financial position on a far 
more solid footing. 
 
Several books and articles have been written about the history of Cork Harbour 
Commissioners from its commencement, these publications could best be described as 
comprehensive and descriptive in detail. In this thesis, to fill a void in the literature, greater 
focus was given to infrastructure, governance, and financial matters as these were vital in 
getting a clearer picture of the history of the Harbour Commissioners in these years.  
Regarding the city quays, if funding had been provided for Nimmo’s proposals the port’s 
infrastructure would have been built sooner and it seems clear that greater priority should 
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have been given to this issue earlier on, which would have reduced the time and costs of 
shipping to merchants, which could, in turn, have been funded by applying slightly higher 
dues to traffic, which fell within the powers vested in CHC from 1820 onwards. As regards the 
lower harbour Brookfield and Lee maintained that CHC was at fault for not investing in 
infrastructure to allow larger liners to come into the harbour.226 The thesis showed how lower 
harbour infrastructure investment, in the 19th century, was not seen as cost-effective by CHC, 
particularly as activity in the upper harbour was financing investment in the lower harbour.227 
 
Like many organisations, it seems that CHC responded quite slowly to the immediate 
challenges it faced after it was established. It took some years to develop the harbour into a 
safe, cost effective and coherent operation adequately handling the import and export 
demands of the port. Improvements took place over decades rather than years, but once the 
necessary infrastructure was put in place the benefits were immediate. Given that the region 
failed to industrialise, and the population of the city stagnated in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, and the population of its hinterland actually declined, the port performed 
reasonably well relative to its competition in the Munster region, Limerick and Waterford, 
and it was better served by rail and road links and its more central location to Munster’s 
wealthier agricultural districts. Dublin and Belfast in contrast both had demographic 
 
226 Brookfield, H.C., ‘Ireland and the Atlantic Ferry; A study in changing geographical values’,  
 Irish Geography, vol. 3, no.2 (1955), pp. 69-78; Lee, William ‘Aspects of the history of Queenstown 
(Cobh) and the Transatlantic Trade 1800-1921’, (unpublished M.A thesis, University College Cork, 
July 2003),  
227 Pettit (1996), p.328. Pettit refers to a submission made by Sir James Long, to the Ports and Harbours 
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advantages and greater industrial development and were in a better position to handle the 
expansion of Anglo-Irish trade in the nineteenth century.  
 
Table 4. 3 Income of Irish Ports 1875-1900 
Port  1875-9 1880-4 1885-9 1890-4 1895-00 Total Ranking 
  % % % % % %   
Belfast 28 30 33 34 37 34 1 
Cork 14 14 13 14 13 13 3 
Drogheda 1 1 2 2 1 2   
Dublin 31 31 26 24 23 26 2 
Dundalk 3 2 2 2 2 2   
Galway 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Kingstown 1 1 1 0 0 0   
Limerick 3 3 3 4 4 4   
L/derry 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 
Sligo 2 2 2 2 2 2   
Waterford 4 4 3 3 2 3   
Total 94 97 93 93 92 94   
Source: http://www.dippam.ac.uk/eppi/documents/ (DIPPAM: Documenting Ireland: 





























     Source: Cork harbourproject.blogspot.com 27th November 2011 




    Source: Cork harbourproject.blogspot.com 27th November 2011 . 





















                                                                        118 
 
Appendix 1.3 Cork Harbour Commissioners: Summary of legislation 1813- 1900 
 
The Butter Weighhouse Act of 1813. Under the Act Commissioners were 
appointed and were to receive 1/3 of the 
proceeds of butter trade.   
Commercial Buildings Act 1814 also 
known as ‘Cocket and Entry Tax’ Act 
Tax on ‘cocket’ and ‘warrant’ on goods 
inwards and outwards. Tax proceeds 
divided between different parties 
including Cork Harbour Commissioners 
(CHC). 
Cork Harbour Act 1820. Formalised constitution and procedures 
of the board with power to charge 
tonnage and goods rates. 
The 1847 Commissioners Clauses Act. Consolidating Act regarding the 
constitution and regulation of public 
bodies such as Commissioners. 
The Harbours Docks and Piers 
Clauses Act 1847 
A general Act authorising the 
construction and improving of Harbours, 
Docks and Piers. 
Cork Harbour Amendment Act 1866, Amended the tonnage rates and dues 
structure; Section iv provided for the 
Chairman of Queenstown Town 
Commissioners to be an ex-officio 
member of CHC.  
The Pier and Harbour Orders 
Confirmation Act 1871 (no. 2) 
Sections of the 1820 Act were repealed 
and Board of Trade permission was 
required before construction of any quay. 
Cork Harbour Act of 1875 Powers were granted to construct a 
deepwater quay on the south bank and 
finance to improve the Lower Harbour. 
The Cork Improvement Act 1875 The Act enabled CHC to pay 50% of the 
cost of removing Anglesea Bridge and 
building a new one.  
Cork Harbour Act 1877 Powers were granted to construct a 
deepwater quay on the north bank and 





























Cork Improvement (Extension of 
Time) Act 1881 
Further time was granted for the building 
of Anglesea (Parnell) Bridge. 
Cork Harbour Act 1883 Section 37 provided for three 
Commissioners to be appointed to 
represent the Lower Harbour. 
Piers& Harbour Orders Confirmation 
Act 1889 
General powers were granted as to the 
issue of stock and sale of land at 
Carrigrennan, Little Island. 
Merchant Shipping (Pilotage) Act 
1889. 
Powers enacted to make byelaws 
regarding contributions to Pilotage funds. 
Cork Harbour (Pilotage) Act 1892] An Act which greatly extended Pilotage 
powers and enlarged the field of 
operations. 
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 Dealt with mainly the registration and 
ownership of ships.  
Local Government Act 1898 Established a democratic system of local 
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Appendix 2.1: Cork Harbour Commissioners  Commodities as % of Imports 
income 
 
  Commodities    
Period Wheat Ind. Corn Flour Coal Total 
  % % % % % 
1877-1881 27 26 1 7 61 
1882-1886 24 10 3 21 58 
1887-1891 18 17 7 20 62 
1892-1896 14 14 7 19 54 
1897-1901 12 16 6 18 52 
Source: CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, the detail was adapted from the accounts 
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Appendix 4.1 CHC Imports, Exports, Tonnage Income as % of Total Income-
1830-1900 
 
Year Imports Exports Tonnage Harbour Total Overall 
      Income 
 £ £ £ £ £ % 
1830 2038 2000 1660  5698 93 
       
1840 2456 2018 2572 179 7225 98 
       
1849 5036 1843 2804 1166 10849 79 
       
1861 9047 2984 5356 2362 19749 98 
       
1870 10887 4156 6785 2681 24509 99 
       
1880 12760 5212 9237 4153 31362 86 
       
1890 12837 4213 15972 2670 35692 99 
       
1900 15723 4107 15758 2434 38022 98 
Source: CCCA/PC, Cork Harbour Commissioners, the detail was adapted from the annual accounts of 
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